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Abstract	
This	paper	studies	the	impact	of	university‐industry	collaboration	
on	 academic	 research	 output.	 We	 analyze	 the	 channels	 through	
which	the	degree	of	industry	collaboration	may	be	affecting	research	
output.	 We	 exploit	 a	 unique	 longitudinal	 dataset	 on	 all	 the	
researchers	 in	 all	 the	 engineering	 departments	 of	 40	 major	
universities	 in	 the	 UK	 for	 the	 last	 20	 years.	 We	 use	 an	 innovative	
measure	 of	 collaboration	 based	 on	 the	 fraction	 of	 public	 research	
grants	 that	 include	 industry	 partners.	 Our	 empirical	 findings	
corroborate	 that	 the	relationship	between	collaboration	degree	and	
publication	rates	is	curvilinear,	and	shed	some	light	on	the	selection	
mechanisms	at	work.	Our	results	are	robust	 to	several	econometric	
methods,	measures	of	research	output,	and	subsamples	of	academics.	
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1 Introduction	
In	a	modern	economy	transforming	scientific	research	into	competitive	advantages	is	
essential.	 In	 the	US,	extensive	collaboration	between	universities	and	 industry,	 and	 the	
ensuing	transfer	of	scientific	knowledge,	is	viewed	as	one	of	the	main	contributors	to	the	
successful	technological	innovation	and	economic	growth	of	the	past	three	decades	ሺHall,	
2004ሻ.	At	the	same	time,	according	to	a	European	Commission	report	ሺ1995ሻ,	insufficient	
interaction	between	universities	and	firms	in	the	EU	has	been	one	of	the	main	factors	for	
the	EU’s	poor	commercial	and	technological	performance	in	high‐tech	sectors.	Nowadays,	
increasing	university‐industry	 collaboration	 is	 a	 primary	policy	 aim	 in	most	developed	
economies.1	 	
The	increased	incentives	ሺor,	as	some	say,	pressureሻ	to	collaborate	with	industry	may	
have	 controversial	 side	 effects	 on	 the	 production	 of	 scientific	 research	 itself.	 Nelson	
ሺ2004ሻ,	 among	many	 others,	 argues	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 industry	 involvement	 might	
delay	 or	 suppress	 scientific	 publication	 and	 the	 dissemination	 of	 preliminary	 results,	
endangering	the	“intellectual	commons”	and	the	practice	of	“open	science”	ሺDasgupta	and	
David,	1994ሻ.	Florida	and	Cohen	ሺ1999ሻ	argue	that	industry	collaboration	might	come	at	
the	expense	of	basic	research:	growing	ties	with	industry	might	be	affecting	the	choice	of	
research	projects,	“skewing”	academic	research	from	a	basic	toward	an	applied	approach.	
Academics	that	contribute	to	knowledge	and	technology	transfer,	on	the	other	hand,	
maintain	 that	 the	existence	of	 industry	 collaboration	complements	 their	own	academic	
research	by	securing	 funds	 for	graduate	students	and	 lab	equipment,	 and	by	providing	
them	with	ideas	for	their	own	research	ሺLee,	2000,	Agrawal	and	Henderson,	2002ሻ.	Siegel	
et	al.	ሺ2003ሻ,	 for	example,	report	that	“ሾsሿome	scientists	explicitly	mentioned	that	these	
interactions	 improved	 the	 quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 their	 basic	 research.”	 Ideas	 sourced	
from	 industry	 may	 thus	 expand	 traditional	 research	 agendas	 ሺRosenberg,	 1998ሻ,	
benefitting	the	overall	scientific	performance	of	researchers.	
These	 opposing	 claims	 raise	 a	 long‐standing	 question	 for	 academic	 research:	 Does	
collaboration	with	industry	increase	or	decrease	publication	rates?	Previous	research	on	
this	 issue	has	mostly	used	patenting	as	a	measure	of	 industry	collaboration	ሺsee	Geuna	
and	 Nesta,	 2006,	 and	 Baldini,	 2008,	 for	 reviewsሻ.	 The	 evidence	 is	 somewhat	 mixed,	
ranging	from	the	negative	effects	of	patenting	on	research	output	reported	in	surveys	of	
                                                 
1	 In	the	1980s,	the	US	introduced	a	series	of	structural	changes	in	the	intellectual	property	regime	accompanied	by	
several	 incentive	 programs,	 designed	 specifically	 to	 promote	 collaboration	 between	 universities	 and	 industry	
ሺLee,	2000;	Mowery	et	al.,	2001ሻ.	Almost	30	years	on,	many	elements	of	the	US	system	of	knowledge	transfer	have	
been	emulated	in	many	other	parts	of	the	world	ሺsee	e.g.,	the	UK	Government’s	White	Paper	“The	Future	of	Higher	
Education,”	2003ሻ.	
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academic	 scientists	 ሺBlumenthal	 et	 al.,	 1996ሻ,	 to	 no	 effect	 in	 some	 of	 the	 econometric	
studies	 ሺAgrawal	 and	Henderson,	 2002ሻ	 to	 even	 a	 positive	 relationship	 in	 some	 of	 the	
recent	evidence	 ሺAzoulay	et	 al.,	 2009;	Breschi	 et	 al.,	 2008;	Fabrizio	and	DiMinin,	2008;	
Stephan	et	al.,	2007;	van	Looy	et	al.,	2006ሻ.	
This	paper	argues	that	academic	research	output	is	affected	not	only	by	the	existence	
of	 links	with	 the	 industry	 but	 also	 by	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration,	 i.e.,	 by	 the	
proportion	 of	 ሺor	 the	 share	 of	 time	 spent	 onሻ	 projects	with	 industry	 involvement.2	 By	
exploring	 the	 channels	 through	 which	 industry	 collaboration	 affects	 publications,	 our	
conceptual	 framework	suggests	 that	 the	relationship	between	collaboration	degree	and	
publication	rates	is	neither	increasing	nor	decreasing	but	is	curvilinear,	described	by	an	
inverted	U‐shaped	curve.	As	a	result,	research	output	shall	be	maximized	at	intermediate	
degrees	 of	 collaboration,	 i.e.,	 when	 the	 industry	 is	 involved	 in	 some	 but	 not	 in	 all	 the	
projects	of	the	academic.	 	
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 uses	 an	 innovative	 measure	 of	 ሺdegree	 ofሻ	 industry	
collaboration	 based	 on	 the	 fraction	 of	 publicly	 funded	 research	 projects	which	 include	
industry	partners.3	 In	contrast	to	patents,	this	measure	is	continuous	in	nature,	and	so	is	
able	to	proxy	not	only	for	the	existence	but	also	for	the	degree	of	industry	collaboration.	
In	 addition,	 collaborative	 links	 through	 joint	 research,	 consulting	 or	 training	
arrangements	 are	more	widespread	 ሺD’Este	 and	 Patel,	 2007ሻ	 and	 are	more	 important	
knowledge	 transfer	 channels	 than	 patents,	 licenses,	 and	 spin‐offs,	 according	 to	 both	
academics	 ሺAgrawal	 and	 Henderson,	 2002ሻ	 and	 firms	 ሺCohen	 et	 al.,	 2002ሻ.	 Data	 on	
research	 collaborations	 also	 provide	 a	 more	 continued	 assessment	 of	 the	 level	 of	
interaction	with	 industry	than	measurements	based	on	the	number	of	patents.	Possibly	
due	to	the	lack	of	comparable	data,	the	literature	has	paid	little	attention	to	these	more	
collaborative	forms	of	university‐industry	interaction.	
Our	measure	 of	 collaboration	 is	 constructed	 exploiting	 comprehensive	 information	
from	 the	main	UK	 government	 agency	 for	 funding	 in	 engineering,	 the	Engineering	 and	
Physical	Sciences	Research	Council	ሺEPSRCሻ,	which	distinguishes	between	collaborative	
and	non‐collaborative	research	grants	based	on	the	involvement	of	industry	partners.	In	
addition	 to	 research	 funds,	 we	 compiled	 a	 unique,	 longitudinal	 dataset	 containing	
                                                 
2	 Our	notion	of	“degree	of	ሺindustryሻ	collaboration”	 is	 inspired	by	the	notion	of	“degree	of	ሺresearchሻ	collaboration”	
used	 in	 bibliometric	 studies.	 As	 shown	 by	 Subramanyam	 ሺ1983ሻ,	 the	 degree	 of	 research	 collaboration	 is	 usually	
defined	as	the	number	of	multicoauthored	papers	out	of	the	total	number	of	papers	ሺsingle	and	multicoauthoredሻ. 
3	 The	 presence	 of	 industry	 partners	 in	 public	 research	 grants	 might	 not	 be	 a	 perfect	 proxy	 for	 the	 degree	 of	
collaboration	with	industry,	as	there	are	other	channels	of	 interaction.	The	inclusion	of	private	firms	as	partners	in	
these	grants,	however,	is	highly	correlated	with	obtaining	direct	funding	from	industry	ሺMeissner,	2011ሻ.	
4 
research	 output	 ሺpublicationsሻ,	 patents,	 and	 other	 individual	 characteristics	 for	 all	
academics	 employed	 in	 all	 the	 engineering	 departments	 of	 40	 major	 UK	 universities	
between	1986	and	2007.	Since	our	dataset	contains	the	majority	of	academic	engineers	
in	the	UK,	our	results	are	not	driven	by	the	most	successful	or	academic	inventors	alone.	
In	fact,	we	can	test	whether	the	effects	differ	across	observed	categories	of	researchers.	
Still,	the	observed	degrees	of	collaboration	are	not	exogenously	determined,	but	are	
the	result	of	individual	and	mutual	choices	in	a	two‐sided	market	of	academics	and	firms	
(Mindruta,	 2013;	 Banal‐Estañol	 et	 al,	 2014).	 Unobserved	 characteristics	 of	 the	
researchers	 may	 affect	 not	 only	 their	 degree	 of	 collaboration	 but	 also	 their	 academic	
productivity,	thereby	influencing	the	shape	of	the	collaboration‐publication	relationship.	
Our	conceptual	framework	analyzes	the	potential	selection	mechanisms	at	work,	and	the	
direction	 of	 the	 biases	 one	 might	 incur	 if	 these	 mechanisms	 were	 ignored	 in	 the	
estimation.	 As	 empirical	 strategy,	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 endogeneity	 problem,	 we	 use	 fixed	
effects	 and	 instrumental	 variable	 techniques	 and,	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 dynamic	
nature	of	the	publications	ሺe.g.,	Arora	et	al.,	1998;	Agrawal	and	Henderson,	2002ሻ,	we	use	
a	 dynamic	 panel	 data	 approach.	 By	 comparing	 instrumented	 and	 non‐instrumented	
regressions	we	shall	also	shed	more	light	on	the	selection	mechansims	in	place.	 	
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	section	2	we	provide	the	conceptual	framework.	
In	section	3	we	describe	the	dataset	and	in	section	4	we	introduce	our	empirical	strategy.	
Section	5	presents	our	results.	Section	6	discusses	and	concludes.	 	
	
2 Conceptual	framework	
Our	 conceptual	 framework	 is	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	
collaboration	 of	 an	 academic	 affects	 the	 main	 determinants	 of	 her	 scientific	 output,	
namely,	 ሺiሻ	 the	 quality	 and	 quantity	 of	 her	 ideas;	 ሺiiሻ	 the	 time	 and	 attention	 she	 can	
devote	to	developing	these	ideas	and	transforming	them	into	papers;	ሺiiiሻ	the	amount	of	
resources	she	has	available;4	 and	ሺivሻ	the	existence	of	constraints on	the	scope	and/or	in	
the	dissemination	of	research	results	ሺStephan,	1996,	2012ሻ.	In	the	first	subsection	below,	
we	 discuss	 the	 channels	 through	 which	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 may	 be	
affecting	research	output.	In	the	second	subsection,	we	consider	the	characteristics	of	the	
academics	 that	may	be	affecting	both	 their	observed	degrees	of	collaboration	and	their	
                                                 
4 	 The availability of research funding is important for scientists in all academic disciplines, but especially in 
resource-intensive fields such as engineering (Stephan, 1996, 2012). Several recent studies have documented a positive impact 
of public grants on research performance (Jacob and Lefgren, 2011; Benavente et al., 2012).	
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research	output.	We	describe	the	potential	selection	mechanisms	at	work,	allowing	us	to	
identify	potential	biases	in	the	estimation.	
2.1 Effects	of	the	degree	of	industry	collaboration	on	research	output	
Collaboration	with	industry	can	boost	research	output	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	
collaboration	can	expand	academics’	research	agendas	and	improve	the	pool	of	research	
ideas	ሺRosenberg,	1998ሻ.	Mansfield	ሺ1995ሻ	shows	that	a	substantial	number	of	publicly	
sponsored	 research	projects	 stem	 from	 industrial	 problems	 encountered	 in	 consulting.	
Collaboration	 helps	 academics	 gain	 new	 insights	 for	 their	 own	 research	 and	 test	 the	
practical	 application	 of	 their	 theoretical	 ideas	 ሺLee,	 2000ሻ.	 The	 generation	 and/or	
refinement	 of	 ideas	 through	 puzzle‐solving	 may	 in	 turn	 improve	 research	 outcomes	
because	the	resulting	ideas	can	be	transformed	into	more	and/or	better	academic	papers.	
Second,	 industry	 collaboration	 can	 expand	 the	 availability	 of	 financial	 resources.	
According	 to	 survey	 evidence	 in	 Lee	 ሺ2000ሻ,	 two	 of	 the	 most	 important	 reasons	 for	
academics	 to	 collaborate	are	 to	 secure	 funds	 for	graduate	 students	and	 lab	equipment,	
and	to	supplement	funds	for	their	academic	research.	In	recent	years,	industry	has	been	
identified	 as	 an	 even	more	 important	 source	of	 funding	 for	 academic	 research.	 Private	
financial	 support	 is	 important	 in	 light	 of	 progressive	 declines	 in	 direct	 government	
funding	ሺOECD,	2010ሻ	and	of	more	competitive	research	environments	ሺStephan,	2012ሻ.	
Nevertheless,	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 is	 not	 necessarily	
positive	 for	 research	 output	 for	 at	 least	 five	 reasons.	 First,	 although	 collaboration	may	
enhance	the	pool	of	research	ideas,	there	might	be	decreasing	returns	to	scale	associated	
to	the	generation	of	these	ideas.	Hottenrott	and	Lawson	ሺ2014ሻ	show	that	research	units	
that	 receive	 larger	 shares	 of	 funding	 originating	 from	 industry	 are	 also	more	 likely	 to	
develop	 ideas	 stemming	 from	 private	 partners,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 pool	 of	 ideas	 for	
higher	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 is	 indeed	 larger.	 But,	 at	 high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration,	
ideas	at	the	margin	may	not	be	of	the	same	quality,	or	may	not	even	be	worth	pursuing,	
and	may	thus	not	result	in	the	same	increase	in	publication	rates	as	the	ideas	obtained	at	
low	degrees	of	collaboration.	 	
Second,	 a	 high	 number	 of	 ideas,	 conceivably	 available	 from	 higher	 degrees	 of	
collaboration,	may	also	create	attention	problems.	According	to	attention‐based	theories	
of	the	firm,	decision‐makers	in	any	organization	need	to	“concentrate	their	energy,	effort	
and	mindfulness	 on	 a	 limited	number	 of	 issues”	 ሺOcasio,	 1997ሻ.	As	 argued	by	 Laursen	
and	Salter	ሺ2006ሻ	in	the	context	of	 innovative	firms,	if	there	are	too	many	ideas,	few	of	
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them	receive	 the	required	 level	of	 time	or	effort	 to	be	developed	seriously.	As	a	 result,	
high	levels	of	collaboration	may	generate	many	ideas	but	few	academic	papers.	 	
Third,	collaborative	projects	usually	require	time	for	coordination,	organization,	and	
interaction.	Collaboration	with	a	private	partner	may	also	come	with	“strings	attached”	in	
the	 form	 of	 academic	 consulting	 or	 commercial	 activities.	 The	 general	 duties	 of	 the	
academics,	and	research	in	particular,	might	be	compromised	by	an	increase	in	the	time	
allocated	 to	 development,	 consulting	 or	 commercialization	 ሺFlorida	 and	 Cohen,	 1999ሻ,	
thus	reducing	scientific	publication.	
Fourth,	 collaboration	may	 affect	 the	 selection	 of	 topics	 and	methodologies	 ሺFlorida	
and	 Cohen,	 1999ሻ.	 As	 argued	 in	 Trajtenberg	 et	 al.	 ሺ1997ሻ,	 industry	 research	 and	
development	 tends	 to	 be	 directed	 at	 commercial	 success,	 while	 university	 research	
generally	 focuses	 on	 solving	 fundamental	 scientific	 questions.	 Thus,	 research	 that	
appeals	 to	 industry	 partners	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 close	 to	 the	 research	 frontier	
ሺRosenberg	 and	 Nelson,	 1994ሻ,	 and	 may	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 ሺtopሻ	 academic	
publications.	This	is	especially	the	case	for	academics	with	high	degrees	of	collaboration	
who	 may	 get	 locked	 in	 service	 provision	 for	 industry	 ሺMeyer‐Krahmer	 and	 Schmoch,	
1998ሻ.	 	
Finally,	 firms’	 commercial	 interests	 might	 impose	 constraints	 on	 the	 publication	
activity	of	 collaborating	academics,	 especially	 those	 that	 collaborate	extensively.	Firms’	
commercial	 interests	 may	 push	 firms	 to	 include	 non‐disclosure	 clauses	 that	 delay	 or	
suppress	 scientific	 publication	 ሺNelson,	 2004ሻ.	 Czarnitzki	 et	 al.	 ሺ2014ሻ	 indeed	 find	
empirical	evidence	 that	 the	percentage	of	 researchers	 that	complain	about	secrecy	and	
publication	delay	is	larger	for	researchers	sponsored	by	industry.	 	
As	 summarized	 in	 the	 upper	 part	 of	 Figure	 1,	 collaboration	 can	 have	 positive	 and	
negative	 effects	 on	 the	 factors	 driving	 academic	 research.	 The	 relative	 magnitudes	 of	
these	 effects	 and	 their	 ultimate	 impact	 on	 publications	 change	 with	 the	 degree	 of	
collaboration.	From	our	discussion,	we	expect	the	negative	effects	to	be	relatively	more	
important	 and,	 thus,	 to	 dominate	 for	 high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 while	 the	 positive	
ones	 shall	 dominate	 for	 low	 degrees	 of	 collaboration.	 We	 therefore	 anticipate	 the	
relationship	 between	 collaboration	 degree	 and	 publication	 rates	 to	 have	 an	 inverted	
U‐shape	and	research	output	to	be	maximized	at	 intermediate	degrees	of	collaboration,	
i.e.,	when	industry	is	involved	in	some	but	not	all	the	projects	of	the	academic.	
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2.2 Mechanisms	influencing	the	collaboration‐research	output	relationship	
This	 subsection	 discusses	 other	 mechanisms	 that	 may	 affect	 the	 relationship	
between	industry	collaboration	and	research	output	described	in	the	previous	subsection.	
We	argue	that	the	degrees	of	collaboration	are	not	exogenously	determined,	but	are	the	
result	 of	 individual	 and	mutual	 choices	 in	 a	 two‐sided	 ‘market’	 of	 academics	and	 firms	
(Mindruta,	2013;	Banal‐Estañol	et	al,	2014).5	 Observed	and	unobserved	characteristics	
of	the	researchers	(such	as	seniority,	ability	or	skills)	may	affect	not	only	their	degree	of	
collaboration	but	also	their	academic	productivity,	 thereby	 influencing	the	shape	of	 the	
collaboration‐publication	 relationship.	 In	 this	 subsection,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 unobserved	
characteristics	 and	describe	 the	potential	mechanisms	at	work,	 by	 ‘type’	 of	 researcher,	
and	the	direction	of	the	biases	one	might	incur	if	these	mechanisms	were	ignored	when	
estimating	the	causal	effect	of	degree	of	collaboration	on	research	output.	 	
Notice	 first	 that	 there	 are	 inherent	 characteristics	 of	 the	 researchers	 that	 make	
them	both	more	 likely	 to	publish	 and	more	 likely	 to	 find	a	 good	partner.	 For	 example,	
ability	 or	 talent	 is	 important	 for	 research	 but	 it	 is	 also	 highly	 valued	 by	 firms	 when	
searching	for	research	partners	(see	e.g.,	Blumenthal	et	al.,	1996).	As	a	result,	highly	able	
academics	may	end	up	having	higher	degrees	of	collaboration	and	better	partners	than	
less‐able	 academics.	 As	 argued	 by	 Blumenthal	 et	 al.	 (1986),	 “the	 most	 obvious	
explanation	for	[the]	observed	positive	relation	[between	collaboration	and	publication]	
is	 that	 companies	 selectively	 support	 talented	 and	 energetic	 faculty	who	were	 already	
highly	productive.”	Through	their	 involvement	with	more	attractive	partners,	 they	may	
end	up	producing	even	more	academic	papers.	As	shown	in	Banal‐Estañol	et	al.	ሺ2013ሻ,	
collaborative	projects	generate	more	publications	than	non‐collaborative	ones	if	and	only	
if	 the	 industrial	 partners	 are	 highly	 productive.	 As	 a	 result,	 if	 one	 does	 not	 take	 into	
account	 the	 presence	 of	 researcher	 “fixed	 effects”	 such	 as	 ability,	 the	 estimation	 may	
generate	positive	biases	on	the	effect	of	high	degrees	of	collaboration	on	publications.	
Time‐invariant	 individual	characteristics	may	also	 interact	with	 time‐variant	ones	
and	 generate	 other	 biases.	 First,	 some	 of	 the	 talented	academics	may	 develop	 stronger	
preferences	 for	 industry	 collaboration	 and	 better	 networking	 skills,	 thereby	 enjoying	
higher‐quality	 interactions	and	more	knowledge	of	 the	private	 sector.	We	expect	 these	
                                                 
5	 Firms	also	weigh	the	benefits	and	costs	of	collaborating	with	academic	partners	(Henderson	et	al.,	1998;	Salter	
and	Martin,	2001;	Cohen	et	al.,	2002;	Link	and	Scott,	2005,	Laursen	et	al.,	2011).	Firms	report	to	collaborate	to	get	
access	to	new	university	research	and	discoveries	(Lee,	2000),	but	are	also	concerned	with	the	organizational	and	
institutional	structure,	and	the	existence	of	the	open	science	culture,	in	academia	ሺDasgupta	and	David,	1994ሻ.	An	
individual	 firm’s	decision	to	collaborate	depends	on	its	absorptive	capacity	ሺVeugelers	and	Cassiman,	2005ሻ,	 its	
size,	and	whether	it	adopts	an	open	search	strategy	ሺMohnen	and	Hoareau,	2003;	Laursen	and	Salter,	2004ሻ.	 	
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“industry‐savvy”	 researchers	 to	 have	 higher	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 and,	 at	 the	 same	
time,	to	choose	and	to	be	chosen	by	better	industrial	partners	because	they	screen	better	
and	they	are	more	appealing	academic	partners.	Thanks	to	their	involvement	with	more	
attractive	 industry	 partners,	 these	 academics	 are	 again	 predicted	 to	 produce	 more	
academic	 papers	 than	 those	 at	 low	 degrees	 of	 collaboration.	 In	 sum,	 more	 engaged	
researchers	may	have	both	higher	degrees	of	 collaboration	and	–	because	 they	end	up	
being	 matched	 with	 better	 partners	 –	 more	 research	 output	 than	 researchers	 lacking	
collaboration	 taste	 and	 networking	 skills.	We	may	 thus	 observe	 a	 positive	 bias	 at	 the	
high‐end	of	 the	degree	of	collaboration	(those	more	 likely	populated	by	 industry‐savvy	
researchers)	 and,	 symmetrically,	 a	 negative	 bias	 at	 low	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	
(populated	by	non‐industry‐savvy	researchers).	 	
Second,	 some	 of	 the	 talented	 academics	 may	 become	more	 output‐driven	 in	 their	
collaboration	choices.	We	expect	these	researchers	to	publish	more	and,	at	the	same	time,	
prefer	 intermediate	 degrees	 of	 collaboration,	 as	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 identify	 and	
ponder	 the	 trade‐offs	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 subsection	 (e.g.,	 new	 ideas	 vs.	 time	
constraints).	 That	 is,	 these	 highly	 able,	 output‐driven	 researchers	 may	 end	 up	 having	
mid‐range	degrees	 of	 collaboration,	while	 less	 able,	 less	 output‐driven	 academics,	may	
end	 up	 having	 insufficient	 or	 excessive	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 that	 negatively	 affect	
their	academic	performance.	In	addition,	the	highly	able	will	also	end	up	partnering	with	
more	attractive	partners,	producing	even	more	papers.	We	may	thus	observe	a	positive	
bias	on	the	mid‐range	degrees	of	collaboration	and	a	negative	bias	in	both	the	low‐	and	
high‐ends	of	the	degree	of	collaboration.	
Third,	some	of	the	talented	researchers	may	also	become	more	selective	over	time,	
given	 the	 increased	 pool	 of	 potential	 industry	 projects	 they	 have	 available.	 While	
collaboration	with	highly	able	scientists	is	the	most	beneficial	 for	firms,	companies	find	
academic	 partners	 across	 a	whole	 quality‐range	 of	 researchers	 and	 departments,	with	
the	 majority	 of	 industry	 funding	 going	 to	 universities	 of	 medium	 research	 quality	
(Mansfield,	 1995).	 Goldfarb	 (2008)	 argues	 that	 star‐scientists	 have	 many	 more	
opportunities	 for	 funding	 but	 it	 is	 the	 less‐able	 researchers	 who	 typically	 engage	 in	
programs	sponsored	by	mission‐oriented	agents	such	as	firms.	Less‐able	academics	may	
have	 to	 accept	 any	 industry	 support	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 or	 increase	 their	 funding	
(Carayol,	2003).	In	sum,	talented,	successful	researchers	may	be	in	a	position	to	be	more	
selective	 and	engage	only	 in	 collaborations	with	high‐quality	 industry	partners.	Due	 to	
the	existence	of	these	types	of	academics,	we	may	observe	a	positive	bias	at	the	low‐end	
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of	 the	 degree	 of	 collaboration	 and	 a	 corresponding	 negative	 bias	 in	 the	 mid‐	 and	
high‐ends.	
The	 selection	mechanisms	described	 in	 this	 section	 are	 summarized	 in	 the	 lower	
part	 of	 Figure	 1.	 As	 explained	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	 empirical	 strategy	 section,	 these	
mechanisms	have	fundamental	implications	for	any	attempt	to	estimate	the	relationship	
between	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 and	 research	 output.	 The	 degree	 of	
collaboration	is	“endogenous,”	and	it	is	affected	by	observed	and	unobserved	individual	
characteristics	that	also	affect	research	output.	Our	empirical	approach	shall	control	for	
time‐invariant	and	time‐variant	observed	characteristics.	We	shall	also	take	into	account	
the	existence	of	unobserved	characteristics	influencing	the	selection	mechanisms	at	work.	
Not	doing	so	would	result	in	a	biased	estimate	of	the	impact	of	degree	of	collaboration	on	
research	 output.	 In	 our	 empirical	 strategy	 section,	 we	 explain	 how	 we	 address	 these	
endogeneity	concerns.  
 
3 Data	 	
In	this	section,	we	provide	a	detailed	account	of	how	we	created	our	dataset.	For	this	
study,	 we	 built	 a	 unique	 longitudinal	 dataset	 containing	 individual	 characteristics,	
publications,	 research	 funds,	 and	 patents	 for	 all	 researchers	 employed	 in	 all	 the	
engineering	departments	of	40	major	UK	universities	between	1986	and	2007	ሺsee	Table	
1	 for	a	 list	of	 the	universitiesሻ.	Through	 the	British	Library,	we	searched	 for	university	
calendars	 and	prospectuses	providing	detailed	 staff	 information	 for	 all	 the	universities	
with	engineering	departments	in	the	UK.6	 Our	final	sample	contains	all	the	universities	
that	had	calendar	 information	available,	 including	all	 the	universities	that	are	members	
of	the	prestigious	Russell	Group,	a	coalition	of	24	research‐intensive	UK	universities,	as	
well	as	16	other	comprehensive	or	technical	universities.7	
We	retrieved	the	academics’	names	and	ranks	for	all	the	years	from	1986	to	2007.	We	
focused	on	academic	staff	carrying	out	both	teaching	and	research	and	did	not	consider	
research	 officers	 or	 teaching	 assistants.	 We	 followed	 the	 researchers’	 career	 paths	
                                                 
6	 By	Act	of	Parliament,	the	British	Library	is	entitled	to	receive	a	free	copy	of	every	item	published	in	the	UK.	These	
data	were	supplemented	with	information	from	the	Internet	Archive,	a	not‐for‐profit	organization	that	maintains	
a	free	Internet	library	committed	to	offering	access	to	digital	collections.	Their	collection	dates	back	to	1996	and	
enabled	us	to	retrieve	information	from	outdated	Internet	sites.	
7	 We	identified	the	initial	set	of	engineering	departments	from	the	1996	and	2001	Research	Assessment	Exercises	
ሺRAEsሻ.	We	 did	 not	 find	 staff	 information	 for	 eight	 institutions	which	 are	 similar	 to	 the	 16	 non‐Russell	 group	
universities	 in	our	sample.	We	did	not	consider	any	of	the	39	post‐92	universities	either,	as	these	were	not	 full	
research	 institutions	 for	 all	 the	 years	 considered	 in	 our	 analysis.	 We	 also	 excluded	 the	 Open	 University	 and	
Cranfield	University	which,	as	distance	and	postgraduate	institutions,	respectively,	have	a	very	different	structure.	
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between	the	different	universities	by	matching	names	and	subject	areas	and	by	checking	
the	 websites	 of	 the	 researchers.	 Academics	 leave	 ሺand	 join	 or	 rejoinሻ	 our	 dataset	 at	
different	 stages	 in	 their	 career,	 when	 they	 move	 to	 ሺor	 fromሻ	 abroad,	 industry,	
departments	other	than	engineering	ሺe.g.,	chemistry,	physicsሻ,	or	universities	that	are	not	
part	 of	 our	dataset,	 resulting	 in	 an	unbalanced	panel.	 They	 represent	 the	basis	 for	 our	
data	collection	and	enable	us	to	retrieve	information	on	publications,	research	funds,	and	
patents.	
Our	final	sample	contains	information	on	3,991	individuals.	The	final	sample	excludes	
all	 inactive	 researchers	 ሺthose	 with	 neither	 publications	 nor	 funds	 during	 the	 entire	
sample	periodሻ	and	researchers	who	were	present	for	less	than	six	consecutive	years	so	
that	all	of	our	 ሺstockሻ	variables	could	be	created.8	 We	describe	below	our	sources	and	
measures	of	research	output	ሺour	dependent	variableሻ,	degree	of	industry	collaboration	
ሺour	 main	 independent	 variableሻ,	 as	 well	 as	 funding,	 patents,	 and	 other	 individual	
characterizing	variables.	We	provide	summary	statistics	in	the	first	panel	of	Table	2.	 	
	
Research	 output.	 Data	 on	 publications	 were	 obtained	 from	 the	 ISI	 Science	 Citation	
Index	 ሺSCIሻ.	 The	 number	 of	 publications	 in	 peer‐reviewed	 journals	 is	 not	 the	 only	
measure	but	is	the	best	recorded	and	the	most	accepted	measure	for	research	output	as	
they	 are	 essential	 for	 gaining	 scientific	 reputation	 and	 for	 career	 advancements	
ሺDasgupta	 and	David,	 1994ሻ.	We	 collected	 information	 on	 all	 the	 articles	 published	 by	
researchers	 in	our	database	while	 they	were	employed	at	one	of	 the	 institutions	 in	our	
sample.	Most	entries	in	the	SCI	database	include	detailed	address	data	that	allowed	us	to	
identify	 institutional	 affiliations	 and	 unequivocally	 assign	 articles	 to	 individual	
researchers.9	 	
As	a	main	measure	of	 research	output	 for	each	researcher	 in	each	year,	we	use	 the	
normal	 count	 of	 publications	 ሺcountitሻ,	 i.e.,	 the	 number	 of	 publications	 in	 t	 on	 which	
researcher	i	is	named	as	an	author.	Publication	counts,	however,	might	be	misleading	for	
articles	 with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 authors	 and	 may	 not	 reflect	 a	 researcher’s	 effective	
productivity.	 Therefore,	 we	 also	 use	 the	 co‐author‐weighted	 count	 of	 publications	
ሺco‐author	weighted	countitሻ,	which	we	obtain	by	weighting	publications	by	the	inverse	
of	the	publication’s	number	of	co‐authors.	
                                                 
8	 Estimations	considering	a	shorter	time	window	of	just	three	consecutive	years	are	used	in	the	robustness	checks.	
The	descriptive	statistics	as	well	as	the	empirical	results	are	very	similar	to	those	of	the	main	estimation.	
9	 Publications	without	address	data	had	to	be	ignored.	However,	we	expect	this	missing	information	to	be	random	
and	to	not	affect	the	data	systematically.	
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We	 also	 separate	 the	 count	 of	 publications	 by	 type	 of	 academic	 research	 ሺbasic	 or	
appliedሻ.	 To	 construct	 these	 measures,	 we	 use	 the	 Patent	 Board	 ሺformerly	 CHIሻ	
classification	ሺversion	2005ሻ,	developed	by	Narin	et	al.	ሺ1976ሻ	and	updated	by	Kimberley	
Hamilton	for	the	National	Science	Foundation	ሺNSFሻ.	Based	on	cross‐citation	matrices,	it	
characterizes	 the	 general	 research	 orientation	 of	 journals,	 distinguishing	 between	 ሺ1ሻ	
applied	technology,	ሺ2ሻ	engineering	and	technological	science,	ሺ3ሻ	applied	and	targeted	
basic	research,	and	ሺ4ሻ	basic	scientific	research.	Godin	ሺ1996ሻ	and	van	Looy	et	al.	ሺ2006ሻ	
reinterpreted	the	categories	as	ሺ1ሻ	applied	technology,	ሺ2ሻ	basic	technology,	ሺ3ሻ	applied	
science,	and	ሺ4ሻ	basic	science;	and	grouped	the	first	two	as	“technology”	and	the	last	two	
as	“science.”	We	use	the	normal	count	of	publications	in	each	of	these	two	categories	and	
denote	 them	“applied”	ሺapplied	countitሻ	and	“basic”	 ሺbasic	countitሻ,	 respectively.	Due	 to	
the	applied	character	of	the	engineering	sciences,	74%	of	all	publications	are	applied.	
	
Degree	of	 industry	 collaboration.	Our	measure	of	 industry	 collaboration	 is	based	on	
grants	awarded	by	the	Engineering	and	Physical	Sciences	Research	Council	ሺEPSRCሻ,	the	
main	UK	government	agency	for	research	in	engineering	and	the	physical	sciences,	and	
by	 far	 the	 largest	 provider	 of	 funding	 for	 research	 in	 engineering	 ሺmore	 than	 50%	 of	
overall	 third‐party	 fundingሻ.	 The	 EPSRC	 encourages	 ሺbut	 does	 not	 requireሻ	 academic	
researchers	to	find	private	partners	for	their	research	projects.	As	defined	by	the	EPSRC,	
“Collaborative	Research	Grants	are	grants	led	by	academic	researchers,	but	involve	other	
partners.”	 Partners	 generally	 contribute	 either	 cash	 or	 “in‐kind”	 services	 to	 the	 full	
economic	cost	of	the	project.10	 	
We	obtained	 information	on	 all	 the	 grants	 awarded	 since	1986.	 For	 each	 grant,	we	
collected	the	start	year,	duration,	total	amount	of	funding,	names	of	principal	investigator	
ሺPIሻ	and	co‐investigators,	grant‐receiving	institution,	and	names	of	partner	organizations,	
if	any.	 In	order	to	construct	our	proxy	for	the	degree	of	collaboration	with	 industry	we	
use	 the	 presence	 of	 private	 partners.	 Our	 variable,	 which	 we	 name	 fraction	 of	 EPSRC	
funding	 with	 industryit,	 represents	 the	 fraction	 of	 collaborative	 EPSRC	 funds	 of	 an	
individual	i	in	the	five	previous	years	ሺi.e.,	between	t‐4	and	tሻ.	We	use	a	five‐year	window	
to	reflect	the	profile	of	an	academic	in	terms	of	her	past	stream	of	funding. 
To	be	precise,	this	variable	was	constructed	as	follows.	We	divided	the	total	monetary	
income	of	each	grant	between	the	PI	and	her	co‐investigatorሺsሻ.	We	took	into	account	the	
                                                 
10	 The	EPSRC	does	not	favor	specific	types	of	academic	research	output.	Both	collaborative	and	non‐collaborative	
grants	are	awarded	based	on	peer‐review	and	monitored	through	end‐of–award	reports.	There	are,	however,	no	
specific	measures	for	evaluating	the	success	of	the	knowledge	exchanges	between	science	and	industry.	
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participation	of	all	 investigators	but	positively	discriminated	PIs	by	assigning	them	half	
the	 grant	 value	 and	 splitting	 the	 remaining	 50%	 among	 the	 co‐investigators.	 PIs	were	
assigned	a	major	part	as	they	are	expected	to	lead	the	project.	We	additionally	spread	the	
grant	value	over	the	award	period.11	 This	was	done	in	order	to	account	for	the	ongoing	
benefits	and	costs	of	the	project	and	to	mitigate	the	effect	of	focusing	all	the	funds	at	the	
start	 of	 the	 project.	 Finally,	 for	 each	 year	 and	 for	 each	 researcher	 we	 computed	 the	
fraction	of	“collaborative”	funds	in	the	last	five	years,	i.e.,	those	that	included	one	or	more	
industry	partners,	over	all	EPSRC	funds	received	in	the	same	period.	 	
	
Funding. As	discussed	in	the	conceptual	framework	section,	the	availability	of	funds	
is	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 research	 output.	We	 therefore	 created	 an	 indicator	 variable	
ሺhad	some	EPSRC	fundingitሻ	that	takes	value	1	if	academic	i	received	any	EPSRC	funding	
ሺcollaborative	or	notሻ	in	the	five	previous	years	and	0	otherwise.	We	used	the	indicator	
instead	 of	 the	 funding	 level	 because	 the	 latter	 is	 discipline‐specific	 ሺsome	 disciplines	
require	more	 funding	 than	 othersሻ.	 As	 for	 industry	 collaboration,	 we	 used	 a	 five‐year	
window	to	reflect	the	academic’s	profile.	
 
Patents.	 In	 the	 conceptual	 framework,	 we	 argued	 that	 the	 commercialization	 of	
research	 results	might	 impose	 constraints	 on	 publication	 activity.	 Our	 analysis	 should	
therefore	control	for	patent	activity.	By	including	patents,	we	also	separate	the	effect	of	
patenting	from	the	effect	of	collaborating	with	industry,	as	defined	above.	Prior	research	
has	 considered	 patenting	 itself	 to	 be	 an	 indicator	 of	 a	 researcher’s	 involvement	 with	
industry.	As	a	 result,	 the	benefits	and	costs	of	 collaboration	might	also	appear	 through	
the	patent	channel.	
We	 obtained	 patent	 data	 from	 the	 European	 Patent	 Office	 ሺEPOሻ	 database.	 We	
collected	 those	 patents	 that	 identify	 the	 aforementioned	 researchers	 as	 inventors	 and	
were	filed	while	they	were	employed	at	one	of	the	40	institutions.	We	not	only	consider	
patents	filed	by	the	universities	themselves,	but	also	those	assigned	to	third	parties,	e.g.,	
industry	or	government	agents	ሺas	shown	by	Lawson,	2013b,	52%	of	academic	patents	in	
the	 UK	 are	 not	 owned	 by	 the	 universityሻ.	 The	 filing	 date	 of	 a	 patent	 was	 recorded	 as	
representing	the	closest	date	to	invention.	Since	the	filing	process	can	take	several	years,	
                                                 
11	 If	the	grant	lasted	two	years,	we	split	it	equally	across	those	two	years.	If	it	lasted	three	or	more	years,	the	first	
and	 the	 last	 years	 ሺwhich	 are	 assumed	 to	 not	 represent	 full	 calendar	 yearsሻ	 received	 half	 the	 share	 of	 an	
intermediate	year.	
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we	were	only	able	to	include	patents	published	by	2007,	hence	filed	before	2005.12	 The	
EPO	 only	 covers	 a	 subsample	 of	 patents	 filed	with	 the	 UK	 Intellectual	 Property	 Office	
ሺUKIPOሻ.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 patents	 that	 are	 taken	 to	 the	 EPO	 are	 those	 with	 a	 higher	
economic	potential	and/or	quality	ሺMaurseth	and	Verspagen,	2002ሻ	and	have	been	used	
in	the	past	to	analyze	academic	patenting	in	Europe	ሺsee	Lissoni	et	al.,	2008ሻ. 
To	measure	 the	 impact	of	patenting	on	 the	 timing	of	publications,	we	use	a	dummy	
variable	indicating	whether	the	academic	i	filed	any	patent	in	the	same	year	ሺpatentitሻ,	or	
in	 the	 two	 years	 preceding	 the	 publication	 ሺpatentit‐1	 and	 patentit‐2ሻ.	 Researchers	 in	
Europe,	unlike	the	US,	cannot	benefit	from	a	“grace	period”	and	hence	have	to	withhold	
any	publication	 related	 to	 the	patent	until	 the	patent	 application	 is	 filed.	We	 therefore	
expect	a	lag	of	up	to	two	years	between	invention	and	publication	in	a	journal.	 	
	
Individual	 characteristics.	 Research	 output	 might	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 researcher’s	
personal	attributes	such	as	sex,	age,	education,	and	academic	rank.	Academic	Rankit	is	the	
only	 time‐variant	 observable	 characteristic	 in	 our	 dataset.	 Thus,	 we	 incorporate	
information	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 researchers’	 academic	 status	 from	 lecturer	 to	 senior	
lecturer,	reader,	and	professor.	Lecturer	corresponds	to	an	assistant	professor	in	the	US,	
whereas	senior	lecturer	and	reader	would	be	equivalent	to	an	associate	professor.	
We	also	include,	as	an	additional	time‐variant	characteristic	of	an	academic	at	a	given	
point	 in	 time,	 her	 past	 publications.	 Indeed,	 as	 argued	 by	 Stephan	 ሺ1996ሻ,	 there	 is	 a	
“cumulative	 advantage”	 in	 science	 that	 results	 in	 a	 dynamic	 relationship	 between	 past	
and	present	publication	output.	 	
	
Interaction	 variables.	 The	 effect	 of	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 on	 research	
output	 might	 differ	 across	 observed	 categories	 of	 academics.	 In	 order	 to	 investigate	
whether	 the	 relationship	 differs	 between	 academics	 who	 have	 certain	 observed	
characteristics,	 we	 create	 indicator	 variables	 that	 reflect	 ሺiሻ	 being	 above	 or	 below	 the	
median	lifetime	share	of	publications	with	industry	co‐authors;	ሺiiሻ	being	above	or	below	
the	median	lifetime	share	of	collaborative	grants;	ሺiiiሻ	being	above	or	below	the	median	
amount	of	funding	during	the	previous	five	years;	ሺivሻ	belonging	to	the	selected	Russell	
group	 of	 universities;	 and,	 ሺvሻ	 being	 at	 an	 earlier	 stage	 of	 their	 careers	 as	 opposed	 to	
being	senior	researchers	ሺprofessorsሻ.	We	allow	researchers	to	change	groups	when	they	
                                                 
12	 Just	like	previous	studies	ሺsee	e.g.,	Fabrizio	and	DiMinin,	2008ሻ,	data	construction	requires	a	manual	search	in	
the	 inventor	database	 to	 identify	 entries	 that	were	 truly	 the	 same	 inventor	 and	exclude	others	with	 similar	or	
identical	names.	This	was	done	by	comparing	 the	address,	 title,	 and	 technology	class	 for	all	patents	potentially	
attributable	to	each	inventor.	The	EPO	database	is	problematic	in	that	many	inventions	have	multiple	entries.	It	
was	thus	necessary	to	compare	priority	numbers	to	ensure	that	each	invention	is	only	included	once	in	our	data.	
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change	 universities	 or	 are	 promoted.	 Panels	 2	 to	 6	 in	 Table	 2	 present	 the	 descriptive	
statistics	of	the	two	main	variables	of	interest	for	these	subsamples.	
 
4 Empirical	strategy	
This	section	describes	the	econometric	specification	of	our	model,	the	methods	we	use	to	
estimate	it,	and	the	instrumental	variables	we	exploit	in	order	to	do	so.	
4.1. Econometric	specification	
According	 to	 our	 conceptual	 framework,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 degree	 of	
collaboration	and	the	publications	of	an	academic	can	be	curvilinear.	Indeed,	increasing	
the	degree	of	collaboration	with	industry	can	boost	research	output,	as	collaboration	may	
improve	the	pool	of	research	ideas	and	expand	the	availability	of	financial	resources.	But,	
at	 high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration,	 it	 may	 also	 be	 negative,	 because	 there	 might	 be	
decreasing	returns	associated	to	the	generation	of	ideas,	extensive	industry	involvement	
may	 impose	 time	constraints	and	cause	attention	problems,	and	commercial	objectives	
and	 strategic	 behavior	 may	 push	 industrial	 partners	 to	 impose	 constraints	 on	 the	
selection	of	topics	and	methodologies	and	the	dissemination	of	research	results.	
So	we	estimate	a	model	where	academic	research	output	is	a	quadratic	function	of	the	
degree	 of	 collaboration	 with	 industry.	 Additionally,	 we	 make	 use	 of	 the	 variables	
described	 in	 the	previous	 section	 to	 control	 for	 other	 factors,	 other	 than	 the	degree	of	
collaboration,	which	may	also	affect	research	output.	We	include,	for	example,	the	ability	
of	having	raised	EPSRC	research	funds,	which	proxies	for	other	resources	the	researcher	
may	 have	 available.	We	 also	 incorporate	 patent	 indicator	 variables	 to	 account	 for	 the	
existence	 of	 other	 constraints	 on	 the	 scope	 and/or	 in	 the	 dissemination	 of	 research	
results.	We	also	 include	past	academic	output	 to	account	 for	other	 factors	affecting	 the	
pool	of	ideas	of	the	researcher	and	her	ability	to	transform	them	into	papers.	To	proxy	for	
seniority	and	the	existence	of	other	time	constraints,	we	also	include	her	academic	rank.	
Accordingly,	we	formulate	the	following	empirical	model:	
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ෍ߙ୨
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ݕ௜ሺ௧ି௝ሻ ൅ ߚଵ݄ ௜݂௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݂݅݊௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ݂݅݊௜௧ିଵଶ ൅෍ߛ௞
ଶ
௞ୀ଴
݌௜ሺ௧ି௞ሻ ൅ ߜݔ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧,	
where	 yit	 stands	 for	 academic	 i's	 research	 output	 at	 time	 t	 ሺeither	 countit,	 co‐author	
weighted	countit,,	applied	countit,	or	basic	countitሻ;	hfit‐1	is	the	indicator	variable	had	some	
EPSRC	 fundingit‐1;	 finit‐1	 is	 the	 fraction	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	 with	 industryit‐1;	 pit	 is	 the	
indicator	variable	patentit	for	having	filed	at	least	one	patent	at	time	t;	and,	xit‐1	is	a	vector	
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of	other	time‐variant	individual	characteristics	including	Academic	Rankit‐1	and	year.	All	
the	independent	variables	except	the	patents	are	lagged	because	of	the	publication	lead	
time.	The	error	term	contains	two	sources	of	error:	the	academic	i’'s	fixed	effect	term	i,	
and	a	disturbance	term	vit.	Since	the	distributions	are	highly	skewed,	we	take	logarithms	
of	 both	 the	 research	 output	 and	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 variables.	 As	 these	
figures	contain	zero	values,	we	add	the	unit	before	we	take	logarithms. 
4.2. Empirical	methods	
The	 presence	 of	 time‐invariant	 individual	 factors,	 i,	 in	 the	 error	 term	 produces	
correlation	 among	 the	 individual	 errors	 across	 different	 periods	 of	 time,	 making	
Ordinary	 Least	 Squares	 ሺOLSሻ	 inefficient	 and	 yielding	 incorrect	 standard	 errors.	 In	
addition,	as	explained	in	the	conceptual	framework,	there	are	inherent	characteristics	of	
the	researchers	ሺe.g.,	ability)	that	make	them	both	more	likely	to	publish	and	more	likely	
to	find	good	partners	and,	therefore,	to	have	higher	degrees	of	collaboration.	This	creates	
problems	of	endogeneity	 for	our	main	variables	of	 interest.	Thus,	we	 first	estimate	our	
model	using	a	Generalized	Least	Squares	with	a	fixed	effects	estimator	ሺGLS	FEሻ.	 	
But	still,	correcting	for	fixed	effects	alone	may	not	be	sufficient	to	address	the	biases	
introduced	by	 the	selection	mechanisms	described	 in	 the	conceptual	 framework.	There	
are	 time‐variant	 unobserved	 individual	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 becoming	 more	
industry‐savvy,	 more	 output‐driven,	 and/or	 more	 selective.	 These	 time‐variant	
individual	unobserved	traits	may	affect	both	research	output	and	degree	of	collaboration	
causing	 the	 latter	 independent	 variable	 to	 be	 again	 endogenous.	 Fixed	 Effects	 based	
methods	are	not	sufficient	in	dealing	with	this	source	of	time‐variant	endogeneity.	Thus,	
to	 obtain	 consistent	 estimates	 of	 the	 coefficients	 of	 interest,	 we	 use	 an	 estimator	 that	
instruments	our	collaboration	measures	with	instrumental	variables	that	affect	industry	
collaboration	 but	 not	 research	 output	 directly	 ሺGLS	 FE	 IVሻ.	 Below,	 we	 discuss	 which	
instruments	we	use.	
GLS	 models,	 though,	 cannot	 correct	 for	 the	 error	 autocorrelation	 created	 by	 the	
inclusion	 of	 past	 research	 outputs	 ሺi.e.,	 lagged	 dependent	 variablesሻ	 as	 explanatory	
variables.	Therefore,	we	also	estimate	a	dynamic	Generalized	Method	of	Moments	ሺGMMሻ	
panel	 data	 model:	 the	 Arellano‐Bond	 GMM	 estimator	 ሺGMM	 ABሻ	 ሺArellano	 and	 Bond,	
1991;	 Blundell	 and	 Bond,	 1998ሻ.	 This	 estimator	 transforms	 the	 model	 into	 first	
differences	 and	 eliminates	 the	 individual	 effects	 –	 and,	 thus,	 the	 cause	 of	 the	
autocorrelation	across	time	periods.	Lagged	dependent	variables	are	instrumented	with	
not	only	the	exogenous	variables	described	in	the	next	subsection	but	also	with	deeper	
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lags	of	the	independent	and	dependent	variables	which	are	remote	enough	in	the	past	so	
that	 their	 correlation	with	 current	 publications	 has	 been	 dissipated.	 Indeed,	 we	make	
sure	 that	 the	GMM	models	 satisfy	 both	 the	Autocorrelation	 test	 and	 the	 Sargan	 test	 of	
over‐identifying	restrictions.13	 In	our	case,	the	required	depth	of	the	lags	is	three	periods,	
whereas	the	funding	history	goes	back	five	years.	To	make	sure	that	this	is	not	the	cause	
of	further	hidden	autocorrelation,	and	as	a	robustness	check,	we	also	estimate	our	model	
using	a	funding	stock	variable	based	on	only	two	years	of	funding,	as	opposed	to	five.	
4.3. Instrumental	variables	
We	 instrument	 the	 fraction	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	 with	 industry	 variable	 using	 the	
economic	activity	of	the	area	and	the	overall	share	of	industry	funding	of	the	department.	
Economic	 activity	 of	 the	 area	 is	 approximated	 by	 the	 yearly	 number	 of	manufacturing	
firms,	 as	 listed	 in	 the	COMPUSTAT	database,	 in	 the	own	and	adjacent	postcodes	of	 the	
university	where	the	academic	works.	The	share	of	funding	from	industry	received	by	the	
whole	 department	 is	 obtained	 from	 Research	 Assessment	 Exercise	 ሺRAEሻ	 data,	 which	
provide	information	on	the	amount	of	research	funds	received	by	each	department	in	the	
UK,	 decomposed	 by	 source	 ሺpublic,	 private,	 and	 other	 fundingሻ	 for	 the	 years	 1993	 to	
2007.	 We	 also	 instrument	 the	 variable	 had	 some	 EPSRC	 funding,	 using	 the	 aggregate	
amount	of	funding	received	by	the	department,	based	on	the	same	RAE	data.	
Our	 instruments	 for	 the	degree	of	collaboration	assume	that	 local	economic	activity	
and	the	overall	industry	involvement	of	the	department	do	not	affect	individual	research	
output	but	do	have	an	impact	on	the	 individual’s	opportunity	to	collaborate	with	firms.	
Similarly,	total	funding	of	the	department,	our	instrument	for	had	some	EPSRC	funding,	
should	 not	 affect	 individual	 research	 output	 but	 should	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	
individual’s	 ability	 and	 opportunity	 to	 obtain	 funds.	 Our	 instruments	 are	 jointly	
significant	in	the	first	stage	regressions.	The	residuals‐based	Smith‐Blundell	test	rejects	
the	exogeneity	of	our	collaboration	variables.	Subsequently,	we	use	the	Sargan/Hansen’s	
statistic	to	test	that	our	instruments	satisfy	the	over‐identifying	restrictions.	Notice	that,	
given	that	some	of	our	instruments	were	only	available	from	1993	onwards,	the	number	
of	observations	is	reduced	in	the	regressions	with	instruments.	 	
	
                                                 
13	 The	 autocorrelation	 test	 of	 the	 Arellano‐Bond	 estimator	 rules	 out	 that	 the	 residuals’	 dynamic	 structure	 is	 a	
source	of	autocorrelation	and	is	thus	an	ignored	cause	of	bias	of	the	estimates.	The	Sargan	test	assumes	that	the	
model	is	identified	and	tests	the	validity	of	the	over‐identifying	restrictions;	in	our	case	that	the	depth	of	the	lags	
of	the	dependent	and	other	regressors	used	as	instruments	is	sufficient	to	rule	out	their	endogeneity.	 	
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5. Empirical	Results	
In	 this	 section	 we	 present	 our	 estimates	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	
collaboration.	We	first	introduce	our	main	results	and	perform	robustness	checks.	Finally,	
we	analyze	whether	the	results	differ	across	observed	categories	of	researchers.	
5.1. Main	Results	
Table	3	reports	the	basic	estimates	of	research	output,	measured	as	the	normal	count	
of	publications.	Column	1	displays	the	estimates	of	the	non‐instrumented	GLS	with	fixed	
effects	ሺGLS	FEሻ	model.	Column	2	shows	the	estimates	of	our	benchmark	model,	the	GLS	
with	 fixed	 effects	 and	 instrumental	 variables	 ሺGLS	 FE	 IVሻ.	 Column	 3	 adds	 one‐	 and	
two‐year	 lagged	 counts	 of	 publications	 as	 explanatory	 variables	 ሺGLS	 FE	 IV	 lagsሻ.14	
Column	4	uses	 the	Arellano‐Bond	GMM	model,	with	 lagged	endogenous	and	exogenous	
variables	and	year	dummies	as	instruments	ሺGMM‐ABሻ.	
At	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 table,	 we	 include	 goodness	 of	 fit	 statistics.	 For	 each	 GLS	
specification,	we	report	the	R2	and	the	F‐statistic	associated	with	the	joint	significance	of	
all	 regressors	 and	 the	 joint	 significance	 of	 the	 instruments.	 The	 null	 of	 joint	
non‐significance	 is	 rejected	 in	 all	 the	models.	 For	 the	 GMM	models,	 we	 report	 ሺiሻ	 the	
Wald	 Chi2	 tests,	 which	 reject	 the	 joint	 non‐significance	 of	 the	 regressors;	 ሺiiሻ	 the	
Sargan/Hansen	 tests,	which	 are	 insignificant,	 suggesting	 that	 the	models	 do	 not	 suffer	
from	over‐identification,	 and	 ሺiiiሻ	 the	Arellano‐Bond	 tests,	which	do	not	 reject	 the	null	
that	there	is	an	absence	of	third	ሺor	higherሻ	order	correlation	of	the	disturbance	terms	of	
our	specifications,	which	is	required	for	the	consistency	of	these	estimates.	 	
We	 proceed	 by	 reporting	 the	 effects	 of	 funding	 and	 degree	 of	 collaboration.	Notice	
that	the	had	some	EPSRC	funding	variable	allows	us	to	compare	the	predicted	number	of	
publications	for	any	degree	of	collaboration	ሺincluding	zeroሻ	to	the	predicted	number	of	
publications	for	a	researcher	without	funding.	In	total,	we	have	a	“baseline”	productivity	
prediction,	i.e.,	the	expected	number	of	publications	for	an	academic	who	does	not	have	
any	funding	ሺhfൌ0	and	finൌ0	in	the	equation	in	section	4.1ሻ,	an	additional	effect	for	those	
that	have	non‐collaborative	funding	ሺhfൌ1	and	finൌ0ሻ	and	another	effect	emanating	from	
the	degree	of	collaboration	ሺhfൌ1	and	 fin൐0ሻ.	As	shown	 in	Table	3,	all	 the	 funding	and	
degree	of	collaboration	coefficients	have	the	same	sign	ሺand	are	all	significantሻ	in	all	the	
specifications.	Thus,	we	first	explain	the	results	using	the	benchmark	specification.	Then	
                                                 
14	 Although	 the	 GLS	 IV	 estimator	 does	 not	 correct	 for	 the	 autocorrelation	 created	 by	 the	 endogeneity	 of	 lagged	
publications,	 we	 include	 this	 specification	 to	 compare	 the	 resulting	 coefficients	 with	 those	 obtained	 using	 the	
GMM‐AB	estimator. 
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we	 compare	 the	 magnitudes	 of	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 benchmark	 to	 those	 of	 the	
non‐instrumented	specification	to	shed	some	light	on	which	of	the	selection	mechanisms	
described	in	the	conceptual	framework	is	consistent	with	the	empirical	findings.	
	
Effect	of	funding	and	degree	of	collaboration	with	industry.	The	antilog	of	the	constant	
term	minus	one,	which	in	the	benchmark	specification	in	column	two	is	equal	to	0.60,	is	
the	 baseline	 productivity	 prediction,	 i.e.,	 the	 expected	 number	 of	 publications	 for	 an	
academic	at	the	lowest	rank	ሺlecturerሻ	who	does	not	have	any	funding	or	patents.	 	
Turning	 to	 our	 measure	 of	 funding,	 we	 find	 that,	 consistent	 with	 our	 conceptual	
framework,	 the	 positive	 and	 significant	 coefficient	 for	 the	 variable	 had	 some	 EPSRC	
fundingt‐1	 ሺβ1	 in	 the	 equation	 in	 section	 4.1ሻ	 corroborates	 that	 ሺnon‐collaborativeሻ	
research	 funding	 enhances	 research	 output.	 The	 coefficient	 implies	 that	 for	 a	 lecturer	
with	no	patents	the	marginal	effect	of	having	non‐collaborative	EPSRC	funding	compared	
to	not	having	any	EPSRC	funding	at	all	is	equal	to	0.35	ሺadditionalሻ	publications.15	 	
The	linear	coefficient	of	the	fraction	of	EPSRC	funding	with	industry	variable	ሺβ2	in	
the	equation	in	section	4.1ሻ	is	positive	and	significant	ሺ0.925ሻ	and	the	coefficient	of	the	
quadratic	 term	 ሺβ3	 in	 the	 same	 equationሻ	 is	 negative	 and	 significant	 ሺ‐1.710ሻ.	 These	
results	 indicate	that	the	effect	of	 the	degree	of	 industry	collaboration	on	the	number	of	
publications	 has	 an	 inverted	 U‐shape.	 According	 to	 the	 estimated	 curve,	 the	 fraction	
EPSRC	 of	 funding	 with	 industry	 that	 would	 result	 in	 the	 maximum	 number	 of	
publications	 is	 0.31.16	 Thus,	 in	 the	 range	 of	 0%	 to	 31%,	 increasing	 the	 fraction	 of	
collaborative	 EPSRC	 funding	 results	 in	more	 publications,	 but	 beyond	 that	 threshold	 a	
higher	fraction	is	associated	with	a	decreasing	number	of	publications.	In	other	words,	all	
else	 equal,	 researchers	 who	 have	 approximately	 one	 third	 of	 their	 EPSRC	 funding	 in	
collaboration	with	the	industry	achieve	the	highest	level	of	research	output.	 	
Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 impact	 of	 funding	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 on	
publications	 for	 the	 benchmark	 specification	 ሺGLS	 FE	 IVሻ	 as	 well	 as	 that	 of	 the	 other	
specifications	 ሺGLS	FE,	GLS	FE	 IV	with	 lags,	 and	GMM‐ABሻ.	Using	 the	estimates	of	each	
model,	we	plot	the	predicted	number	of	publications	against	the	degree	of	collaborative	
EPSRC	funding	for	a	lecturer	with	no	patents.	The	degree	of	collaborative	EPSRC	funding	
ranges	 from	 0%	 to	 100%,	 i.e.,	 from	 no	 funding	 involving	 industry	 partners	 ሺall	
                                                 
15	 This	marginal	effect	is	the	difference	between	the	baseline	number	of	publications	when	the	academic	had	some	
EPSRC	funding	‐	the	antilog	of	ሺ0.471൅0.199ሻ	minus	one	‐	and	the	baseline	publications	calculated	as	described	
above	‐	the	antilog	of	0.471	minus	one. 
16	 This	is	the	antilog	ሺminus	oneሻ	of	the	fraction	x	satisfying	the	first	order	condition	of	the	number	of	publications’	
maximization	problem,	i.e.,	x*ൌβ2	/ሾ‐2*β3	ሿ.	
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non‐collaborativeሻ	 to	 all	 funding	 including	 industry	 partners.	 For	 the	 benchmark	
specification,	we	also	plot	the	predicted	number	of	publications	for	a	researcher	that	has	
not	received	any	EPSRC	funding	ሺthe	predicted	number	is	similar	for	the	other	modelsሻ.	
	
Comparing	 the	 GLS	 IV	 FE	 benchmark	 to	 the	 non‐instrumented	 specifications.	 For	 all	
specifications,	the	intercept	and	the	linear	coefficient	are	positive	and	significant	and	the	
quadratic	term	is	negative	and	significant.	Thus,	independently	of	the	estimation	method	
chosen,	the	effect	of	the	degree	of	industry	collaboration	on	the	number	of	publications	is	
curvilinear	and	the	curve	has	an	inverted	U‐shape,	as	for	the	benchmark.	Noticeably,	the	
curve	estimated	without	instrumenting	ሺGLS	FEሻ	is	flatter,	peaks	at	higher	degrees	and,	
more	 importantly,	 lies	below	 the	GLS	 specifications	 that	 instrument	 collaboration	 ሺGLS	
FE	IV,	GLS	FE	IV	with	lagsሻ	for	degrees	of	collaboration	below	80%	and	above	for	those	
above	80%.	Thus,	not	accounting	for	the	endogeneity	problem	results	in	a	negative	bias	
for	low	and	medium	degrees	of	collaboration	and	a	positive	bias	for	high	degrees.	 	
Relating	 these	 empirical	 findings	 to	 our	 conceptual	 framework,	 we	 conclude	 that	
when	we	 instrument	 the	degree	of	 industry	 collaboration	using	measures	 of	 economic	
activity	 around	 the	 academics’	 universities,	 and	 thus	 control	 for	 supply	 side	
opportunities	 for	collaboration,	we	remove	part	of	 the	positive	bias	on	publications	 for	
high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 introduced	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	
industry‐savvy	 researchers.	 These	 academics	 manage	 to	 select	 and	 to	 be	 selected	 by	
high‐quality	partners.	Contrarily,	 the	negative	bias	of	 the	un‐instrumented	specification	
observed	at	the	lower	end	of	the	degree	of	collaboration	could	be	due	to	the	presence	of	a	
large	 proportion	 of	 non‐industry‐savvy	 researchers	 that	 have	 not	 developed	 the	 same	
screening	capacity,	and	are	not	as	appealing	academic	partners	to	collaborate	with.	
The	 negative	 bias	 for	 low	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 is	 also	 consistent	 with	 the	
existence	 of	 less‐able	 academics	 becoming	 less	 output‐driven	 and	 choosing	 ሺor	 being	
forced	to	chooseሻ	degrees	of	collaboration	that	are	too	low.	In	contrast,	the	negative	bias	
obtained	 for	 intermediate	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 is	 inconsistent	with	 the	 hypothesis	
that	 talented	 and	 output‐driven	 academics	 would	 choose	 intermediate	 degrees	 of	
collaboration.	 The	 positive	 bias	 observed	 for	 high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 is	 also	
inconsistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	less‐able	and	less	output‐driven	academics	choose	
degrees	of	collaboration	that	are	too	high.	 	
Finally,	the	potential	positive	bias	of	the	highly	selective	academics	at	the	lower	end	
of	the	distribution	of	degrees	of	collaboration	does	not	exist	or	must	be	overcome	by	the	
negative	 bias	 introduced	 by	 the	 non‐industry‐savvy	 researchers	 or	 the	 less	
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‐output‐driven,	i.e.,	the	proportion	of	highly	able	selective	academics	in	the	lower	degrees	
of	 collaboration	 appears	 to	 be	 low.	 At	 high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration,	 the	 plausible	
negative	 bias	 introduced	 by	 lower‐able	 academics	 undertaking	 a	 high	 number	 of	
collaborative	 projects	 with	 low	 publication	 potential,	 seems	 to	 be	 dominated	 by	 the	
positive	bias	introduced	by	the	industry‐savvy	researchers.	 	
	
Effects	 of	 past	 research	 output:	 Note	 that	 the	 curve	 obtained	 using	 the	 GMM‐AB	
specification	is	above	all	other	curves	for	all	degrees	of	collaboration.	This	is	because,	as	
shown	 in	 column	 4	 of	 Table	 3,	 the	 GMM‐AB	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 previous	
year’s	publications	is	positive,	significant,	and	large.	Because	we	have	taken	logarithms,	
we	 can	 interpret	 this	 coefficient	 as	 an	 elasticity.	 Thus,	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	
publications	 in	 the	 previous	 year	 by	 100%	 ሺi.e.,	 doubling	 themሻ	 would	 result	 in	 the	
following	year’s	expected	number	of	publications	increasing	by	82	percentage	points.	 	
As	 in	earlier	papers,	our	estimates	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	persistence	 in	publications.	
Several	explanations	are	possible.	First,	there	can	be	a	“Matthew	effect”	ሺMerton,	1968ሻ,	
which	 describes	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 work	 of	 those	 with	 a	 higher	 number	 of	
publications	receive	greater	recognition	than	equivalent	work	by	those	that	publish	less.	
Second,	a	higher	number	of	publications	reinforces	the	attractiveness	of	the	academic	as	
a	 collaborator,	 increasing	 her	 chances	 of	 obtaining	 more	 and/or	 better	 industrial	
partners	and,	in	turn,	higher	returns	on	her	collaborations	in	terms	of	research	output.	 	
Still,	the	GMM‐AB	results	do	not	change	qualitatively	our	results	and	corroborate	that	
the	relationship	between	the	degree	of	collaboration	with	industry	and	research	output	
can	be	represented	as	an	inverted	U‐shape	even	when	we	control	for	the	positive	effect	of	
past	research	performance.	
	
Effects	of	the	other	explanatory	variables.	We	control	for	the	number	of	patents	filed	
by	the	academic	to	take	into	account	other	constraints	on	the	scope	of	research	and/or	in	
the	dissemination	of	research	results	and	to	compare	our	results	to	previous	papers	ሺe.g.,	
Azoulay	et	al.,	2009;	Breschi	et	al.,	2008ሻ.	In	accordance	with	the	recent	literature,	having	
filed	patents	in	the	current	year	ሺtሻ	is	positively	associated	with	publications,	both	for	the	
GLS	IV	FE	and	the	GMM‐AB	models.	The	marginal	increases,	however,	are	small.17	 In	the	
GLS	IV	FE	model,	having	filed	patents	in	each	of	the	previous	two	years	ሺt‐1	and	t‐2ሻ	is	
also	 positive	 and	 significant.	 The	 marginal	 increases	 associated	 with	 patents	 filed	 in	
                                                 
17	 The	 associated	 effect	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	 antilog	 ሺminus	 oneሻ	 of	 the	 coefficient	 of	 the	 indicator	 variable	 and	
ranges	from	0.04	to	0.06	extra	publications. 
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current	and	 in	previous	years	are	very	similar,	 thus	not	suggesting	a	publication	delay.	
These	coefficients	are	positive	but	not	significant	in	the	GMM‐AB	model.	
We	further	control	 for	academic	rank	but	we	find	a	significant	effect	of	seniority	on	
publications	 only	 for	 the	 non‐instrumented	 model.	 The	 effect	 of	 seniority	 in	 the	
instrumental	 variables’	 regressions	 is	 absorbed	 by	 the	 instrumented	 funding	 variable.	
Seniority	may	thus	be	better	at	explaining	access	to	funding	than	publication	counts.	 	
5.2. 	 Robustness	checks	
In	 Table	 4,	 we	 reproduce	 the	 results	 of	 our	 benchmark	 model	 using	 different	
measures	of	research	output	and	collaboration	and	a	balanced	sample	of	academics.	
	
Co‐author‐weighted	 count	of	 publications.	The	 first	 column	 shows	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
fraction	of	collaborative	EPSRC	funding	when	publications	are	weighted	by	the	number	
of	co‐authors.	The	baseline	number	of	the	co‐author	weighted	publication	count	is	0.33.	
The	coefficients	of	the	linear	and	quadratic	terms	of	the	fraction	of	EPSRC	funding	with	
industry	 variable	 are	 significant.	 The	 effect	 of	 the	had	 some	EPSRC	 funding	 variable	 is	
insignificant,	suggesting	that	funding	may	increase	the	number	of	publications	simply	by	
increasing	 the	 size	of	 the	 teams.	This	 is	 further	 suggested	by	 the	negative	 effect	 of	 the	
professor	dummy,	as	these	may	primarily	benefit	from	larger	labs	through	co‐authorship.	
The	effect	of	patents	is	positive	and	significant	as	in	the	benchmark	regression	in	Table	3.	
	
Count	 of	 basic	 and	 applied	publications.	 Columns	2	 and	3	 decompose	 the	 effects	 by	
research	orientation.	We	report	the	estimates	of	the	impact	of	the	degree	of	collaboration	
on	 the	 count	of	 applied	 ሺ“technology”ሻ	 and	basic	 ሺ“science”ሻ	publications.	The	baseline	
number	of	 applied	and	basic	articles	 is,	 respectively,	0.33	and	0.11.	Thus,	 the	expected	
number	of	basic	publications	is	lower	than	that	for	applied	publications.	The	existence	of	
EPSRC	 funding	positively	 impacts	 the	number	 of	 basic	publications,	 but	 the	 fraction	of	
collaborative	 EPSRC	 funding	 does	 not.	 For	 applied	 research,	 the	 linear	 and	 quadratic	
coefficients	 associated	 with	 industry	 collaboration	 variables	 are	 instead	 significant,	
similar	to	the	benchmark	regression	in	Table	3.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	we	consider	
the	field	of	engineering,	where	the	majority	of	publications	are	classified	as	“applied.”	
The	 effect	of	 patents	 also	differs	by	 type	of	 research.	Our	 results	 in	 the	benchmark	
specification	in	Table	3	show	that	having	filed	a	patent	in	the	current	and	in	each	of	the	
two	previous	years	significantly	increases	the	overall	number	of	publications.	Columns	2	
and	3	in	Table	4	show	that	when	separating	the	effect	for	applied	and	basic	publications,	
all	 the	coefficients	of	having	 filed	patents	retain	the	positive	sign.	There	are	 interesting	
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differences,	 however,	 in	 terms	 of	 magnitude	 and	 significance.	 We	 find	 a	 significant	
positive	 contemporaneous	 effect	 of	 patenting	 on	 basic	 publications	 and	 a	 delayed	
significant	positive	 effect	 on	applied	ones.	 Indeed,	while	 basic	 research	may	produce	 a	
variety	of	complementary	research	outputs	that	can	result	in	publications	and	patents,	it	
may	be	delaying	the	publication	of	more	applied,	technically‐oriented,	research	papers.	
	
Two‐year	based	funding	stock.	The	estimates	in	column	4	use	a	variation	of	the	main	
explanatory	variables.	Here,	the	variables	had	some	EPSRC	funding	and	fraction	of	EPSRC	
funding	with	industry	include	the	stream	of	funds	received	in	the	last	two	years	only	ሺas	
opposed	to	the	last	fiveሻ.	Although	this	choice	is	a	less	accurate	reflection	of	the	funding	
profile	of	the	academic,	it	deals	better	with	potential	autocorrelation	issues.	Additionally,	
basing	our	measure	on	a	shorter	window	allows	younger	and	more	mobile	researchers	to	
enter	the	sample.	All	coefficients	of	interest	have	the	same	sign	and	similar	magnitude	as	
in	the	main	five‐year	stock	regressions.	The	degree	of	collaborative	funding	resulting	in	
the	maximum	 number	 of	 publications	 is	 lower	 than	 that	 of	 the	 benchmark	 regression	
ሺ0.17	as	opposed	to	0.31ሻ.	This	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	 funded	projects	usually	 last	
longer	 than	 two	years.	The	positive,	 long‐term	effects	of	 collaboration	may	not	be	well	
captured	 and	 the	 degree‐maximizing	 output	 is	 smaller.	 Instead,	 the	model	 attributes	 a	
very	large	part	of	the	variation	in	publications	to	the	variable	had	some	EPSRC	funding.	 	
	
Balanced	 sample.	 The	 specification	 in	 column	 5	 is	 estimated	 using	 only	 those	
researchers	that	can	be	observed	for	the	full	last	15	years	of	our	sample,	so	that	we	are	
able	 to	build	 the	 five‐year	 funding	 and	 industry	 collaboration	 variables	 and	 estimate	 a	
balanced	10‐year	panel.	This	specification	enables	us	to	explore	whether	the	full‐sample	
estimates	have	been	 significantly	affected	by	attrition.	Again,	 all	 coefficients	of	 interest	
have	 the	 same	 sign	 and	 similar	magnitude	 as	 in	 the	 full‐sample	 regressions,	which	we	
interpret	as	being	an	indication	that	attrition	has	not	caused	important	biases	in	the	main	
estimates.	The	degree	resulting	in	maximum	number	of	publications	is	also	very	similar.	 	
5.3. Results	by	categories	of	academics	
In	 Table	 5,	 we	 test	 how	 our	 benchmark	 model	 results	 differ	 across	 categories	 of	
academics	by	interacting	our	main	explanatory	variables	ሺhad	some	EPSRC	funding	and	
fraction	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	with	 industryሻ	with	 different	 group‐indicator	 variables.	 For	
each	 categorization,	 the	 group	 indicator	 variable	 takes	 the	 value	 0	 if	 the	 academic	
belongs	to	the	so‐called	reference	group	and	the	value	1	 if	 the	academic	belongs	to	the	
non‐reference	 group.	 Thus,	 the	 main	 coefficient	 of	 a	 given	 regressor	 ሺfor	 instance,	
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fraction	 of	EPSRC	 funding	with	 industryt‐1ሻ	 reflects	 its	 effect	 for	 those	 in	 the	 reference	
group.	The	effect	for	those	in	the	non‐reference	group	is	obtained	by	adding	to	the	main	
coefficient	the	coefficient	associated	to	the	interacted	term	ሺgroup	indicator	*	fraction	of	
EPSRC	funding	with	industryt‐1ሻ,	 if	significantly	different	from	zero.	As	explained	below,	
the	trade‐off	between	industry	collaboration	and	publications	exists	for	all	the	categories	
of	 researchers	analyzed.	That	 is,	 the	effect	of	 the	 linear	 term	of	 the	variable	 fraction	of	
EPSRC	 with	 industry	 is	 positive	 and	 that	 of	 the	 quadratic	 term	 is	 negative	 for	 all	
specifications,	both	 for	 the	 reference	and	 the	non‐reference	groups.	The	magnitudes	of	
the	effects,	however,	differ.	
The	 first	 column	 distinguishes	 between	 academics	 who	 are	 high	 collaborators	 in	
terms	 of	 having	 an	 above	 the	median	 share	 of	 publications	 co‐authored	with	 industry	
ሺreference	groupሻ	 from	those	that	have	an	average	below	the	median.	The	main	effects	
for	 the	 linear	 and	 quadratic	 terms	 of	 the	 variable	 fraction	 of	 EPSRC	with	 industry	 are	
larger	 than	 those	 in	 the	benchmark	case	 in	Table	3.	Thus	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
degree	 of	 collaboration	 and	 publications	 for	 high‐collaborators	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	
more	concave	curve	 than	the	relationship	corresponding	 to	 the	benchmark’s	estimates.	
The	 interaction	 terms’	 estimates	 are	 significant	 and	 of	 the	 opposite	 sign,	 albeit	 of	 a	
smaller	 magnitude,	 than	 the	 main	 effects.	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	 relationship	 for	 the	
group	 of	 low‐collaborators	 is	 still	 an	 inverted	 U‐shape,	 albeit	 less	 concave.	 Therefore,	
occasional	 collaborators	also	experience	gains	and	 losses	when	varying	 their	degree	of	
collaboration,	 but	 the	 effects	 are	 weaker.	 Indeed,	 the	 breadth	 of	 ideas,	 the	 funding	
obtained,	as	well	as	 the	constraints	 imposed,	seem	relatively	more	 important	 for	heavy	
collaborators.	
The	second	column	distinguishes	academics	with	an	above‐the‐median	percentage	of	
average	lifetime	of	EPSRC	funding	with	industry	ሺreference	groupሻ	from	those	below.	The	
magnitude	 of	 the	 main	 effects	 on	 publications	 is	 larger	 than	 those	 in	 the	 benchmark	
model	 and	 is	 also	 larger	 than	 those	 in	 column	1.	 This	 suggests	 that	 high	 collaborators	
based	on	lifetime	funding	exhibit	a	relationship	between	the	degree	of	collaboration	and	
publications	 that	 is	 even	more	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 the	degree	of	 collaboration	 than	
the	 relationship	 of	 high‐collaborators	 based	 on	 joint	 publications.	 The	 correction	
estimates	for	low‐collaborators	as	per	this	measure	are	not	significant.	
The	third	column	separates	academics	with	high	levels	of	funding,	i.e.,	those	above	the	
median	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	 received	 in	 the	 last	 5	 years,	 from	 those	with	
lower	 levels	 of	 funding.	 Again	 the	main	 coefficients	 of	 the	 funding	 variables	 are	 larger	
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than	those	of	the	baseline	model	in	Table	3.	In	addition,	the	correction	coefficients	for	the	
non‐reference	group	are	not	significantly	different	from	zero.	 	
In	column	4,	we	distinguish	between	academics	working	in	a	Russell	group	university	
from	those	that	do	not.	We	find	similar	coefficients	to	those	in	the	benchmark	model	and	
no	 significant	 difference	 between	 researchers	 in	 the	 group	 of	 well‐known	 research	
intensive	 institutions	 from	 those	 in	 lesser‐known	 and	 less‐funded	 institutions.	 Lower	
levels	of	core	funding	may	force	smaller	 institutions	to	rely	relatively	more	on	external	
grants	ሺPerkmann	et	al.,	2013ሻ	and	result	in	higher	degrees	of	engagement	with	industry	
ሺD’Este	 and	 Patel,	 2005ሻ.	 But,	 the	 trade‐offs	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 in	 terms	 of	
academic	output	appear	to	be	similar	for	academics	at	very	different	kinds	of	institutions.	 	
Lastly,	column	5	distinguishes	between	academics	that	are	of	a	lower	academic	rank	
from	those	holding	the	rank	of	full	professor.	The	trade‐off	associated	with	the	degree	of	
collaboration	may	have	been	less	pronounced	for	senior	academics.	Extensive	experience	
and	 consolidated	 networks	 could	 make	 the	 new	 insights	 and	 the	 additional	 funds	
acquired	through	collaboration	relatively	less	relevant,	but	at	the	same	time	constraints	
may	 also	 be	 less	 important.	 Young	 researchers,	 instead,	 are	 at	 a	 crucial	 point	 of	 their	
careers,	 and	 their	 research	 output	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 relatively	 more	 sensitive	 to	
collaboration	 ሺDasgupta	 and	 David,	 1994ሻ. According	 to	 our	 estimates,	 though,	 a	
professor	does	not	experience	a	significantly	different	 impact	of	 the	degree	of	 industry	
collaboration	compared	to	someone	at	a	lower	academic	rank.	 	
Overall,	we	 conclude	 that	 although	 there	 are	 significant	 differences,	 the	 curvilinear	
effect	of	the	degree	of	industry	collaboration	holds	for	different	categories	of	academics.	
We	interpret	this	as	evidence	of	the	robustness	of	our	results.	 	
	
6. Discussion	and	Conclusion	
The	 effect	 of	 research	 collaboration	 on	 publication	 outcomes	 has	 received	 little	
attention	 in	 the	 academic	 literature	 to	 date,	which	 has	 primarily	 focused	 on	 academic	
patenting	 and	 spin‐off	 formations	 as	 channels	 of	 interaction	 between	 science	 and	
industry.	 Many	 authors	 have	 argued,	 though,	 that	 research	 collaborations,	 contract	
research,	and	consultancy	are	far	more	important	channels	of	knowledge	transfer.	They	
are,	however,	more	difficult	 to	measure	empirically	and	even	more	difficult	 to	compare	
across	 institutions	 and	 time,	 which	 may	 explain	 why	 the	 literature	 has	 paid	 scant	
attention	to	these	more	collaborative	forms	of	university‐industry	interactions.	
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This	 paper	 uses	 homogeneous	 information	 on	 the	 collaborative	 grants	 awarded	 by	
the	EPSRC,	by	far	the	most	important	funding	source	of	research	in	engineering	sciences	
in	the	UK,	to	measure	university‐industry	collaboration	over	a	20‐year	period.	We	show	
that	 the	 effect	 of	 collaboration	 depends	 on	 the	 share	 of	 projects	 undertaken	 in	
collaboration	with	industry,	i.e.,	on	the	degree	of	collaboration.	Our	results	indicate	that	
the	number	of	publications	increases	both	with	the	presence	of	EPSRC	funding	and	with	
the	 fraction	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	 in	 collaboration	with	 industry,	 but	 only	 up	 to	 a	 certain	
point.	For	degrees	of	collaboration	above	30%–40%,	research	output	declines.	
These	 results	 confirm	 the	 expectations	 of	 our	 conceptual	 framework	which	 argues	
that	 the	 degree	 of	 collaboration‐publication	 relationship	 could	 be	 described	 by	 an	
inverted	U‐shaped	curve.	Indeed,	the	formation	of	links	with	the	private	sector	may	boost	
research	output	because	collaboration	can	provide	new	ideas	and	additional	funding.	But,	
high	 degrees	 of	 collaboration	 can	 also	 damage	 research	 output,	 as	 research	 ideas	may	
then	be	of	lower	value,	industry	may	impose	non‐disclosure	clauses	or	because	extensive	
collaboration	could	reduce	the	time	to	do	research	and	cause	attention	problems.	
Our	results	may	provide	an	explanation	for	some	of	the	ሺapparently	mixedሻ	results	in	
the	literature,	which	has	effectively	focused	on	linear	relationships.	On	the	one	hand,	they	
might	 explain	 the	 positive	 effects	 documented	 in	 studies	 that	 investigate	 forms	 of	
collaboration	that	require	little	to	no	direct	interaction	ሺe.g.,	contact	through	technology	
transfer	offices	and	trade	fairs,	as	in	Hottenrott	and	Lawson,	2014ሻ.	Academic	patenting	
can	 also	 be	 viewed	 as	 collaboration	 requiring	 low	 levels	 of	 interaction	 ሺAgrawal	 and	
Henderson,	 2002ሻ.	 The	 evidence	 of	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 patenting	 and	
publications	 ሺAzoulay	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Breschi	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Fabrizio	 and	 DiMinin,	 2008;	
Stephan	et	al.,	2007;	van	Looy	et	al.,	2005ሻ	is	then	consistent	with	the	idea	of	patenting	
being	on	the	increasing	part	of	the	inverted	U‐shaped	curve.	
But,	on	the	other	hand,	our	results	can	also	explain	the	negative	effects	documented	in	
other	 studies.	 Previous	 research	 that	 investigates	 the	 effects	 of	 forms	 of	 collaboration	
that	require	substantial	interaction,	as	for	example	in	academic	start‐ups,	find	a	negative	
effect.	Toole	and	Czarnitzki	ሺ2010ሻ	show	that	US	academics	that	receive	funding	to	start	
or	join	for‐profit	firms	are	more	productive	than	their	peers,	but	that	they	produce	fewer	
publications	after	receiving	the	grant.	Goldfarb	ሺ2008ሻ	tracks	a	sample	of	221	university	
researchers	 funded	 by	 the	NASA	 and	 concludes	 that	 researchers	 repeatedly	 funded	 by	
the	NASA	experienced	a	reduction	in	academic	output.	In	these	cases,	the	effect	is	likely	
to	have	been	that	associated	to	the	decreasing	part	of	the	inverted	U‐shaped	curve.	
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Our	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 various	 measures	 of	 academic	 research	 output	 and	 to	
various	 subsamples	 of	 academics.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 remarks	 are	 in	 order.	 Basic	
research	 output	 is	 positively	 affected	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	 but	 not	
significantly	 affected	 by	 the	 degree	 of	 industry	 collaboration.	 Conversely,	 for	 applied	
publications	 we	 find	 no	 significant	 effect	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 EPSRC	 funding	 but	 a	
significant	 inverted	U‐shaped	effect	of	 the	degree	of	 industry	collaboration.	 Indeed,	 the	
effects	of	collaboration	identified	 in	the	conceptual	 framework	are	especially	 important	
for	 applied	 research.	 The	 availability	 of	 financial	 resources,	 one	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	
collaboration,	 is	 key	 for	 applied	 research	 programs.18	 Research	 ideas	 arising	 from	
collaboration	are	also	more	likely	to	be	turned	into	applied	research	papers.	At	the	same	
time,	 publication	 constraints	 should	 especially	 affect	 applied	 publications	 as	 applied	
research	 can	be	published	as	patents	or	publications,	 resulting	 in	potential	publication	
delays	ሺPerkmann	and	Walsh,	2009ሻ.	
A	key	challenge	in	our	analysis	is	that	the	observed	degrees	of	collaboration	are	not	
exogenous,	but	are	the	result	of	individual	and	bilateral	choices	in	a	two‐sided	“market”	
of	academics	and	firms.	Our	conceptual	 framework	shows	that	the	direction	of	the	bias	
one	might	incur,	if	selection	issues	are	ignored,	depends	on	which	mechanism	is	at	work.	
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 compares	 the	 results	 of	 our	 instrumental‐variable	 benchmark	
specification	 to	 those	 of	 a	 non‐instrumented	 regression	 to	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 which	
mechanism	 is	 the	 most	 important	 in	 our	 data.	 We	 document	 a	 negative	 bias	 for	 low	
degrees	of	collaboration	and	a	positive	bias	for	high	degrees.	This	is	consistent	with	the	
presence	 of	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 “industry‐savvy”	 researchers	 at	 the	 high‐end	 of	 the	
range	 of	 the	 degrees	 of	 industry	 collaboration.	 Indeed,	 this	 presence	 shall	 introduce	 a	
positive	bias	 in	publications	because	 industry‐savvy	researchers	end	up	being	matched	
with	more	productive	firm	partners,	resulting	in	more	productive	research	projects.	 	
Our	results	also	bolster	empirical	evidence	from	previous	surveys	and	cross‐sectional	
studies	on	the	effects	of	collaborative	research	funding	on	academic	output	by	showing	
that	 these	 results	 hold	 for	 a	 large	 longitudinal	 sample.	 Even	 after	 controlling	 for	
endogeneity,	 we	 find	 supportive	 evidence	 of	 the	 positive	 impact	 of	 the	 existence	 of	
collaboration,	as	in	Gulbrandsen	and	Smeby	ሺ2005ሻ.	The	negative	effect	of	high	degrees	
of	collaboration	is	also	consistent	with	other	survey	results	ሺBlumenthal	et	al.,	1996ሻ	and	
cross‐section	empirical	evidence	ሺManjarres‐Henriquez	et	al.,	2009ሻ.	 	
                                                 
18	 Financial	rewards,	however,	might	also	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	production	of	basic	research	because	basic	
and	 applied	 research	 efforts	 are	 complementary	 ሺThursby	 et	 al.,	 2007ሻ	 or	 because	 they	 induce	 a	 selection	 of	
riskier	and	more	basic	research	programms	ሺBanal‐Estañol	and	Macho‐Stadler,	2010ሻ. 
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We	also	find	a	direct,	positive	effect	of	patenting	on	publications,	just	as	in	the	earlier	
literature.	The	contemporaneous	effect	of	patent	disclosure	is	similar	to	the	one	of	past	
patents,	giving	no	evidence	of	a	“secrecy”	effect.	Yet,	when	we	distinguish	between	types	
of	 research,	 we	 find	 a	 stronger	 contemporaneous	 effect	 of	 patents	 on	 publications	 in	
basic	 science	 journals.	 This	 may	 explain	 the	 positive	 correlation	 found	 in	 papers	 that	
analyze	 publication	 and	 patenting	 activity	 of	 researchers	 in	 basic	 sciences,	 e.g.,	
life‐science	ሺAzoulay	et	al.,	2009;	Breschi	et	al.,	2008ሻ	and	the	lack	of	contemporaneous	
correlation	found	in	papers	that	analyze	applied	sciences,	e.g.,	engineering	ሺAgrawal	and	
Henderson,	 2002ሻ.	 We	 do,	 however,	 find	 a	 delayed	 positive	 effect	 of	 patenting	 for	
publications	 in	 applied	 journals,	 suggesting	 that	 applied	 research	 may	 suffer	 from	
secrecy.	Perkmann	and	Walsh	ሺ2009ሻ	indeed	argue	that	more	applied	projects	are	more	
likely	to	be	affected	by	secrecy	because	of	their	immediate	commercial	viability.	
In	 terms	 of	 policy	 or	 managerial	 implications,	 our	 findings	 suggest	 that	 program	
interventions	 encouraging	 academic	 researchers	 to	 collaborate	 with	 industry	 may	 be	
beneficial.	A	moderate	degree	of	industry	collaboration	not	only	facilitates	the	transfer	of	
knowledge	 and	 accelerates	 the	 exploitation	 of	 new	 inventions,	 but	 it	 also	 increases	
academic	 research	 output.	 Our	 results	 point	 at	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 academic	 policies	
that	 favor	 the	 separation	 of	 tasks	 at	 the	 university.	 If	 some	 faculty	members	 focus	 on	
research	while	 others	 perform	other	 activities	 such	 as	 collaboration	 and	 development,	
scientific	 output	 might	 suffer.	 Indeed,	 according	 to	 our	 estimates,	 two	 academics	
collaborating	 moderately	 ሺdegree	 of	 30–50%ሻ	 would	 publish	 more	 than	 a	
non‐collaborating	and	a	fully	collaborating	one	combined	ሺdegrees	of	0%	and	60–100%ሻ.	 	
On	 the	other	hand,	 our	 results	 also	 indicate	 that	 there	 are	degrees	of	 collaboration	
that	may	be	excessive	in	the	sense	of	being	detrimental	in	terms	of	research	productivity.	
Several	 factors	 point	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 degrees	 of	 industry	 collaboration	 in	 recent	
times	 ሺStephan,	 2012ሻ.	 As	 the	 degrees	 of	 involvement	 with	 industry	 increase,	 more	
academics	may	 find	 themselves	on	 the	decreasing	part	of	 the	 curve.	 Indeed,	 academics	
might	 start	 pursuing	 research	 lines	 that	 no	 longer	 result	 in	 breakthrough	 discoveries	
resulting	in	fewer	publications.	In	addition,	high	degrees	of	collaboration	can	negatively	
affect	 material	 and	 data	 exchange	 between	 academics	 and	 thus	 be	 damaging	 to	 the	
academic	community	as	a	whole	ሺStephan,	2012ሻ.	But,	high	degrees	of	collaboration	can	
also	bring	gains	in	terms	of	patenting	or	better	employment	prospects	for	graduates.	 	
Ours	can	only	be	a	 first	step	 in	 the	analysis	of	 the	effects	of	 the	various	channels	of	
knowledge	 transfer.	We	had	 to	 limit	 our	 analysis	 to	 research	 collaborations	 sponsored	
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through	public	funding,	which	can	only	proxy	for	the	extent	of	the	collaboration	activities.	
Including	 private	 partners	 in	 these	 grants,	 though,	 is	 highly	 correlated	 with	 obtaining	
direct	 funding	 from	 the	 industry	 (Meissner,	 2011).	 We	 therefore	 expect	 that	 the	
curvilinear	effect	would	remain	unhindered	if,	instead	of	using	our	measure	of	degree	of	
industry	 collaboration,	 we	 were	 to	 use	 the	 overall	 degree	 of	 engagement.	 In	 terms	 of	
magnitudes,	 though,	 the	 curve	 may	 peak	 at	 higher	 degrees	 of	 collaboration.	 First,	
mechanically,	 if	direct	funding	is	added	in	the	numerator	and	denominator,	the	fraction	
increases.	Second,	because	of	the	positive	correlation,	the	researchers	with	one	third	of	
their	EPSRC	funds	with	industry	shall	have	a	substantial	amount	of	direct	funding.	 	
With	 more	 comprehensive	 and	 homogeneous	 information,	 we	 could	 also	 make	
comparisons	 between	 the	 effects	 of	 research	 collaboration	 and	 other	 channels	 of	
knowledge	 transfer	 such	 as	 consultancy	 and	 patents.	 In	 our	 sample,	 research	
collaborations	have	a	stronger	impact	than	patents.	It	might	also	be	of	interest	to	tackle	
interactions	between	the	different	channels.	We	know	little	about	whether	collaboration	
channels	 complement	or	 substitute	 each	other.	Consultancy,	 for	 example,	might	have	a	
positive	 effect	 on	 research	output	 if	 and	only	 if	 it	 is	 complemented	by	 collaboration	 in	
research.	Of	course,	this	is	only	a	conjecture	and	a	challenging	task	for	future	research.	
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Russell Group Universities Number of ID* Number of 
Observations
Other Universities Number of ID Number of 
Observations
Birmingham, University of 193 1523 Aberdeen, University of 45 358
Bristol University 82 581 Aston University 62 573
Cambridge, University of 191 1541 Bangor University 30 179
Cardiff, University of 99 802 Brunel University 117 810
Durham, University of 43 308 City University, London 62 556
Edinburgh, University of 92 724 Dundee, University of 49 400
Exeter, University of 40 317 Essex, University of 29 295
Glasgow, University of 108 1033 Hull, University of 37 338
Imperial College London 268 2109 Heriot Watt University 141 1119
Kings College London 48 330 Lancaster, University of 26 230
Leeds, University of 165 1212 Leicester, University of 37 245
Liverpool, University of 102 888 Loughborough, University of 236 1847
Manchester, University ofǂ 322 2614 Reading, University of 47 395
Newcastle, University of 143 1188 Salford, University of 99 788
Nottingham, University of 167 1317 Strathclyde, University of 179 1563
Oxford, University of 97 843 Swansea University 94 856
Queen Mary London 82 575
Queens University, Belfast 101 920
Sheffield, University of 176 1293
Southampton, University of 136 1060
University College London 127 1045
Warwick, University of 64 621
York, University of 27 205
* Researchers can belong to more than one university during their career. Therefore the numbers of IDs do not add up to 3,991, the number of unique individuals in our sample.
Table 1: List of Universities
Full Sample (33601 obs) countt had some fundingit
fraction of 
funding with 
industryit 
Dependent Variables
countit 1.64 2.68 0 41 1 0.228*** 0.125***
co‐author weighted countit 0.59 0.93 0 12.26 0.916*** 0.208*** 0.106***
average impact factorit 0.44 0.72 0 27.07 0.436*** 0.167*** 0.100***
applied countit 0.9 1.62 0 24 0.778*** 0.206*** 0.122***
basic countit 0.46 1.52 0 26 0.712*** 0.125*** 0.0216***
Explanatory Variables
had some EPSRC fundingit 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.228*** 1 0.405***
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry it 0.2 0.35 0 1 0.125*** 0.405*** 1
patentit 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.124*** 0.0794*** 0.0577***
lecturerit 0.34 0.48 0 1 ‐0.183*** ‐0.194*** ‐0.0998***
senior lecturerit 0.28 0.45 0 1 ‐0.104*** ‐0.0511*** ‐0.0204***
readerit 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.0853*** 0.0453*** 0.0276***
professorit 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.242*** 0.228*** 0.109***
Low vs high collaborators in publicationsƚ (27667 obs)
Dependent Variables mean sd min max mean sd Min max
countit 1.43 2.41 0 37 2.22 3.13 0 41 ***
Explanatory Variables
had some EPSRC fundingit 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.73 0.44 0 1 ***
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry it 0.19 0.34 0 1 0.3 0.38 0 1 ***
Low vs high collaborators in fundingƚƚ (23645 obs)
Dependent Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max
countit 1.71 2.62 0 37 2.26 3.2 0 41 ***
Explanatory Variables
had some EPSRC fundingit 0.78 0.42 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1 ***
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry it 0.07 0.19 0 1 0.5 0.41 0 1 ***
Low vs high recipients of fundingƚƚƚ (28508 obs)
Dependent Variables mean sd min max mean sd Min max
countit 0.97 1.73 0 23 2.45 3.3 0 41 ***
Explanatory Variables
had some EPSRC fundingit 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.89 0.31 0 1 ***
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry it 0.11 0.31 0 0 0.36 0.38 0 1 ***
Type of institution (28508 obs)
Dependent Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max
countit 2.02 3.02 0 41 1.25 2.16 0 33 ***
Explanatory Variables
had some EPSRC fundingit 0.68 0.47 0 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 ***
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry it 0.24 0.37 0 1 0.24 0.38 0 1
Academic rank (28508 obs)
Dependent Variables mean sd min max mean sd Min max
countit 2.86 3.66 0 41 1.36 2.25 0 32 ***
Explanatory Variables
had some EPSRC fundingit 0.84 0.37 0 1 0.59 0.49 0 1 ***
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry it 0.3 0.36 0 1 0.22 0.37 0 1 ***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
ƚ High (low) collaborators are those who have an average lifetime collaborative publications with the industry  above (below) the median. Academics with zero publications excluded.
ƚƚ High (low) collaborators are those who have an average lifetime collaborative EPSRC funding with the industry  above (below) the median. Academics with zero funding excluded.
ƚƚƚ High (low) funding receivers are those who have received EPSRC funding in the previous 5 years  above (below) the median.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Correlation with
Low Funding  (12853 obs) High Funding (15655 obs)
Low Collaborators  (13484 obs) High Collaborators (14183 obs)
mean sd min max
Low Collaborators  (11188 obs) High Collaborators (12457 obs)
Russell Group  (18374 obs) Non‐Russell Group (8408 obs)
Professor  (7955 obs) Not Professor (20553 obs)
t‐test 
difference
t‐test 
difference
t‐test 
difference
t‐test 
difference
t‐test 
difference
1 2 3 4
Model GLS FE GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GMM ABƚ
Dependent variable countit countit countit countit
Funding and Collaboration:
had some EPSRC fundingit‐1 0.044*** 0.199** 0.203** 0.066*
(0.013) (0.083) (0.083) (0.035)
fraction of EPSRC funding with industryit‐1 0.373*** 0.925*** 0.897*** 0.286*
(0.099) (0.352) (0.344) (0.167)
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry2it‐1 ‐0.421*** ‐1.710*** ‐1.651*** ‐0.432*
(0.145) (0.655) (0.638) (0.249)
Patent Filed:
patentit 0.026 0.040* 0.040* 0.059**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
patentit‐1 0.014 0.037* 0.035* 0.014
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025)
patentit‐2 0.037* 0.039* 0.038* 0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
Academic Rank:
senior lecturerit‐1 0.048*** 0.025 0.022 ‐0.013
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009)
readerit‐1 0.093*** ‐0.002 ‐0.007 0.001
(0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020)
professorit‐1 0.109*** ‐0.003 ‐0.009 0.017
(0.025) (0.032) (0.032) (0.019)
Lagged Publications:
countit‐1 0.031*** 0.820***
(0.008) (0.046)
countit‐2 0.003 0.042***
(0.007) (0.015)
Constant 0.479*** 0.471*** 0.453*** 0.087***
(0.014) (0.039) (0.040) (0.022)
Number of observations 33601 28508 28508 26782
Number of ID 3991 3975 3975 3724
Number of instruments 0 3 3 164
F (Joint sig. of instr. in 1st stage) 14.25*** 14.25***
R^2 (overall) 0.247 0.087 0.369
F 19.072*** 8.961*** 8.709***
Wald chi2 12597***
AR(1) test z (p‐value) 0
AR(2) test z (p‐value) 0
AR(3) test z (p‐value) 0.7205
Sargan  test (p‐value) 0.1699
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01.
Table 3: Impact of Industry Collaboration on Research Output ǂ
ƚ Endogenous variables are fraction of EPSRC funding with industry  and lagged count . Lagged endogenous 
and exogenous variables and year dummies are used as instruments.
ǂ The dependent variable, the lagged dependent variables and the fraction of EPSRC funding with industry 
are in logarithms. 
1 2 3 4 5
Model GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GLS FE IV
Dependent Variable co‐author weighted countit applied countit basic      countit  countit countit
Collaboration stock 5 yrs 5 yrs 5 yrs 2 yrs 5 yrs 
Sample Full Full Full Full 10 yr BPƚƚ
Funding and Collaboration:
had some EPSRC fundingit‐1 0.079 0.100 0.184*** 0.580*** 0.243**
(0.051) (0.074) (0.054) (0.142) (0.104)
fraction of EPSRC funding with industryit‐1 0.720*** 0.952*** 0.028 0.992*** 0.994**
(0.214) (0.307) (0.209) (0.331) (0.438)
fraction of EPSRC funding with industry2it‐1 ‐1.535*** ‐1.785*** ‐0.509 ‐3.228*** ‐2.154***
(0.395) (0.575) (0.399) (0.661) (0.811)
Patent Filed:
patentit 0.029** 0.030 0.034** 0.050** 0.043*
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
patentit‐1 0.028** 0.014 0.012 0.042** 0.013
(0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.024)
patentit‐2 0.026* 0.045** 0.021 0.043** 0.043*
(0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.026)
Academic Rank:
senior lecturerit‐1 0.012 0.017 ‐0.004 0.053*** ‐0.016
(0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.023)
readerit‐1 ‐0.003 ‐0.000 ‐0.006 0.014 ‐0.033
(0.017) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.033)
professorit‐1 ‐0.034* 0.002 ‐0.010 ‐0.015 ‐0.034
(0.021) (0.030) (0.022) (0.031) (0.039)
Constant 0.282*** 0.283*** 0.106*** 0.236*** 0.536***
(0.024) (0.036) (0.026) (0.071) (0.097)
Number of observations 28508 28508 28508 31837 16250
Number of ID 3975 3975 3975 4436 1625
R^2 (overall) 0.001 0.054 0.03 0.131 0.197
F 8.80*** 7.93*** 2.12*** 13.119*** 6.986***
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01.
ǂ The dependent variable and the fraction of EPSRC funding with industry  are in logarithms. 
ƚƚ Balanced panel of 10 years.
Table 4: Impact of Industry Collaboration for other Measures of Research Output ǂ
1 2 3 4 5
Model GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GLS FE IV GLS FE IV
Dependent Variable countit countit countit countit countit
Reference group (group indicator it‐1=0) high collab high collab high funding Russell group non professor
Non‐reference group (group indicator it‐1=1) low collab ƚ  low collabƚƚ low funding ƚƚƚ non Russell group  professor
Funding and Collaboration:
had some EPSRC fundingit‐1 0.236** 0.142 0.161* 0.175** 0.161*
(0.105) (0.107) (0.087) (‐0.088) (0.087)
group indicatorit‐1 * had some EPSRC fundingit‐1 ‐0.090 0.047 0.004 ‐0.1 0.259
(0.129) (0.139) (0.048) (‐0.087) (0.190)
fraction of EPSRC funding with industryit‐1 1.364*** 1.580*** 1.270*** 1.051*** 0.862**
(0.414) (0.430) (0.392) (‐0.389) (0.382)
group indicatorit‐1 * fraction of EPSRC funding with industryit‐1 ‐0.846** ‐0.509 ‐0.073 ‐0.038 ‐0.812
(0.359) (0.389) (0.291) (‐0.344) (0.612)
fraction of ESPRC funding with industry2it‐1 ‐2.687*** ‐2.723*** ‐2.177*** ‐1.386* ‐1.677**
(0.814) (0.845) (0.743) (‐0.74) (0.810)
group indicatorit‐1 * fraction of EPSRC funding with industry2it‐1 1.810** ‐0.120 ‐0.685 ‐0.676 1.511
(0.837) (0.902) (0.700) (‐0.809) (1.212)
Patent Filed:
patentit 0.040* 0.029 0.039* 0.040* 0.040*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (‐0.021) (0.021)
patentit‐1 0.036* 0.031 0.034* 0.037* 0.037*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (‐0.02) (0.020)
patentit‐2 0.040* 0.031 0.036* 0.038* 0.039*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (‐0.021) (0.021)
Academic Rank:
senior lecturerit‐1 0.025 0.017 0.022 0.027 0.030
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (‐0.019) (0.019)
readerit‐1 ‐0.004 ‐0.015 ‐0.012 ‐0.002 0.008
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (‐0.027) (0.028)
professorit‐1 ‐0.006 ‐0.028 ‐0.024 ‐0.004 ‐0.091
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (‐0.032) (0.144)
Constant 0.490*** 0.573*** 0.518*** 0.451*** 0.502***
(0.040) (0.086) (0.042) (‐0.079) (0.082)
Number of observations 27667 23645 28508 28508 28508
Number of ID 3833 3150 3975 3975 3975
R^2 (overall) 0.105 0.053 0.180 0.101 0.089
F 7.963*** 8.209*** 9.637*** 8.669*** 7.923***
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01.
ƚƚ Based on being below the median in the percentage of average lifetime EPSRC funding with the industry. Academics with zero funding excluded.
ƚƚ Based on being below the median in the amount of EPSRC funding received in the past 5 years.
Table 5: Impact of Industry Collaboration by Groups of Academicsǂ
ǂ The dependent variable and the  fraction of EPSRC funding with industry  are in logarithms. 
ƚ Based on being below the median in the percentage of publications co‐authored with the industry. Academics with zero publications excluded.
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    Figure 2: Estimated publications by fraction of EPSRC funding with industry. 
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pr
ed
ic
te
d n
um
be
r o
f p
ub
lic
at
io
ns
Fraction of EPSRC funding with industry
GLS FE GLS FE IV (benchmark model)
GLS FE IV lags GMM AB
GLS FE IV (no EPSRC funding)
